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Abstract 
I present a semantics for the language of first-order additive-multiplicative linear logic, i.e. 
the language of classical first-order logic with two sorts of disjunction and conjunction. The 
semantics allows us to capture intuitions often associated with linear logic or constructivism 
such as sentences = games, sentences = resources or sentences =problems, where “truth” means 
existence of an effective winning (resource-using, problem-solving) strategy. 
The paper introduces a decidable first-order logic ET in the above language and gives a proof 
of its soundness and completeness (in the full language) with respect to this semantics. Allowing 
noneffective strategies in the latter is shown to lead to classical logic. 
The semantics presented here is very similar to Blass’s game semantics (A. Blass, “A game 
semantics for linear logic”, Ann. Pure Appl. Logic 56). Although there is no straightforward 
reduction between the two corresponding notions of validity, my completeness proof can likely 
be adapted to the logic induced by Blass’s semantics to show its decidability (via equality to 
ET), which was the main problem let? open in Blass’s paper. 
The reader needs to be familiar with classical (but not necessarily linear) logic and arithmetic. 
Keywords: Linear logic; Affine logic; Game semantics; Resource semantics; Arithmetic; Problem solving 
AMS classification: primary 03F50; secondary 68T20; 68455; 03B60; 03F30; 03B70; 03B25 
1. Introduction 
One of the most controversial points of logical semantics is the existential quantifier, 
. ..3x . ..) 
read as 
. . there exists x such that.. . , 
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or, sometimes, as 
. . . there can be found x such that . . . 
The two readings are usually perceived as synonyms, and still the difference between 
them is crucial. “There exists” sounds metaphysical, whereas “can be found” means 
something that deals with reality. To leave alone the philosophy on the right of “exis- 
tence” of the classical notion of existence, it simply has no practical meaning. Consider 
the sentence 
For every disease there is a medicine which cures that disease. 
If there is no way of finding, for each disease, a cure of it but we still know somehow 
that this sentence is true in the classical sense, we have no reason to be happier than 
we would be in the case if it were false. ’ In general, truth or falsity of a sentence 
can concern us only as far as this can signify something, can somehow be reflected in 
reality. 
Of course, “can be found” is a relative notion. Found by whom? If by God or 
another almighty being, then “exists” is really a synonym of “can be found”. But the 
most interesting specification of “by whom” is by a Turing machine. 
This treatment of the existential quantifier, when existence means being possible 
to be found by a machine, is captured by the nonclassical concept of “truth” which 
I suggest in this work and which will be called effective truth. The gist of the semantics 
of effective truth is that sentences are considered as certain tasks, problems which are 
to be solved by a machine, that is, by an agent who has an effective strategy for doing 
this; effective truth means existence of such a strategy. 
The most convenient way of shaping this approach is to build all the semantics in 
terms of games: 
a task (problem) = the task (problem) of winning a certain game. 
There are two players in our games: Proponent, asserting a sentence, and Opponent 
who tries to refute it. Proponent, who represents me (us), is supposed to follow only 
effective strategies, whereas Opponent can use any strategy, for he is meant to represent 
blind forces of nature, or the devil himself. 
The universal quantifier will always mean Opponent’s move and the existential 
quantifier will mean Proponent’s move. The above “medical” proposition can now be 
understood as the game each play of which consists of two moves: the first move is 
made by Opponent, who names an arbitrary disease d, and the second move is Propo- 
nent’s, who must name a medicine m; the play is won by Proponent, if m really is a cure 
i A naive opponent could object: The classical truth of this sentence means that we can try all the chemical 
stuffs, one by one, and sooner or later, one of them will work, so we do have a reason to be happy. Then 
I would give two answers in the same naive manner: First, what the opponent suggests already is a way of 
finding the medicine, and second: in fact this way is hardly a good way, because the poor sick man will, 
most Iikely, be poisoned and die before we reach the appropriate medicine. 
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of d. Effective truth of this proposition can now really be a reason for leading a quiet 
life: we have an effective strategy (machine) such that, using it, we can always find 
a cure of any disease sent to us by the devil. 
The connective V will be treated in the same manner as the existential quantifier. 
Say, 
VX(XEPVX#P) 
will be understood as the game each play of which, again, consists of two moves: first 
Opponent chooses an object n, which leads to the position n E P V n $ P, and then 
Proponent chooses between left and right, getting thus one of the positions n E P or 
n #P; the play is won by Proponent, if n belongs to P and he has chosen left, or n 
does not belong to P and right has been chosen. It is clear that effective truth of this 
proposition means nothing but decidability of the predicate XEP. 
In general, saying that a given sentence is effectively true, we always assert that 
certain relation similar to decidability (but may be much more sophisticated than the 
latter) holds, as, e.g., the binary relation expressed by the sentence Vx(x E P Vx E Q). 
Effective truth of this sentence means that there is an effective way of choosing, for 
each object a, one of the two sets P, Q such that a belongs to this set. 
In the above examples the operator V connects atomic formulas (games). In a more 
general case, for Proponent, to win the game czt Va2 means that after he has chosen 
one of the components ai, he must continue playing and win the game Ui, whereas the 
other component should be abandoned for ever. There is however another natural sort 
of disjunction, denoted by V. The position cciVc12 does not oblige Proponent to choose 
one of the cli and give up the other. He can make a move in one of the components, 
reserving at the same time the other, and switch any moment from c11 to ~(2 and back; 
the task is, playing in fact simultaneously in the two components, to win at least in 
one of them. 
Strict definitions will be given in the main text (Sections 2 and 3), but now, in order 
to develop intuition, we continue discussing some more “naive” examples. 
I am in prison. My prison cell has two doors locked from the outside, the left-hand 
door and the right-hand door. My goal is to escape, and for that it is enough to pass 
through one of the doors. I happen to know that tonight one of the doors has been 
unlocked. Consider the proposition 
The left-hand door is unlocked or the right-hand door is unlocked. 
In order to escape it is enough for me to be able to “solve” this game (problem), in 
the role of Proponent, with “or” understood as V: it is not necessary to be able to 
determine, at the very beginning, exactly which door is unlocked, I can simply try both 
and one of them will turn out to be unlocked. I write “solve” with quotation marks 
because in this game there are no moves at all and, under our assumption that one of 
the doors is really unlocked, it is trivially won. 
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Let us now slightly change the situation: the doors were not locked but mined, and 
tonight someone has removed the mine from one of the doors. Yes, we need now just 
V, and V will not do any more. 
We treat negation 1 in the following way: the rules of the game la are the same 
as of IX, only with the roles of Proponent and Opponent interchanged. 
Example. Let C be a version of chess to win which for Proponent means to win 
a usual chess play within at most 100 moves, playing white. Then 42 will be the 
game to win which for Proponent means not to lose within 100 moves a chess play, 
playing black. 2 
Notice that the classical principle ~,a = CI does hold with our negation: after in- 
terchanging the roles twice, each player comes to his initial role. That means that all 
classical dualities work. In particular, V can be defined in terms of (3, -) by VX a(x) = 
13X7X(X). 
As the game of chess has been mentioned, a temptation arises to discuss one more 
example (which, however, must not be very original). Consider the game 
C being defined as above. This is in fact a play on two chessboards. On the left board 
Proponent plays white and on the right one he plays black. Proponent’s task is to win 
in the sense of usual chess (well, with the within-lOO-moves amendment) on one of 
the chessboards. As switching components in a O-play is Proponent’s privilege, he has 
to move only in the case when the chess rules on both boards oblige him to move. 
I.e., as soon as Opponent has to move at least on one of the chessboards, Proponent 
can wait until Opponent makes this move. 
I the Proponent, being not very good at chess, still can win this game even if my 
opponent is the world champion Kasparov, if I use the following strategy (solution): 
After Kasparov makes his first move on the right chessboard (where he plays white), 
I repeat the same move on the left chessboard (where I play white), then copy Kas- 
parov’s reply to this move back on the right chessboard and so on. This winning 
strategy can be used for any game of the type aVTa, which means that the principle 
aVla is valid in our sense. 
As for the game CV 42, where at the very beginning I have to choose one of the 
chessboards and then win just on it, I have little chance to defeat Kasparov. 3 
To each sort of disjunction corresponds its dual conjunction, so we have two con- 
junctions A and A, ar\p formally defined as -(-av~fi) and ang as -(-aV+). 
z In this example C is not a proposition but rather a “pure” game, and the propositional connective - 
is thus an operation on games. But this is normal because propositions for us are nothing but games, and 
propositional connectives - operations on games. 
3 However, taking into account that there is only a finite number of all possible plays of C, the game 
CV-C has an effective solution (winning strategy for me), even if no modem machine is strong enough to 
follow this strategy. Still, a little bit more carefully chosen example would convince us that the game aVla 
is not always effectively solvable. 
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For example, if I play with Kasparov the game CV-C, to Kasparov this is the game 
XnC. He has to win on both chessboards. Besides, he has to move as soon as the 
chess rules oblige him to move on at least one of the boards. 
Using the terminology of linear logic, we shall call V the additive disjunction, A 
the additive conjunction, V the multiplicative disjunction and n the multiplicative 
conjunction. 
That we use some terminology of linear logic is no accident. The logic of effective 
truth, i.e. the set of always effectively true sentences (like MVTX), called efictive 
tautologies, turns out to be an extension of Girard’s [3] multiplicative-additive linear 
logic (MALL), in fact, a proper extension of MALL+weakening (the so-called BCK 
or Affine Logic), and the behavior of our additive and multiplicative connectives is 
very much similar to the behavior of those in linear logic. 
Linear logic and other substructural logics are often called “resource log&“. The 
people who first introduced logics of this type had some resource intuition in their 
minds, although this intuition has never been formalized as a strict semantics for the full 
language. And the name “resource logics” is related with some syntactic characteristics 
of these logics rather than justified semantically. These syntactic characteristics are 
determined by the forbidden rules of contraction or weakening. If we call formulas in 
a sequent resources, and read the sequent Al,. . .,A,, =+ r as “The collection Al,. . .,A,, 
of resources is enough for getting P (let us not try to specify what “getting” means), 
then the contraction rule 
A.A.0 =+ r 
A,O=+r 
says something like that you always can double any of your resources; that is, if the 
collection A,A, 0 was enough for getting r, then, this rule says, so is the collection 
A, 0, because you can double A in the latter. 
And the weakening rule 
says that you always can reduce the resources you possess; that is, if you can achieve 
r with the resource 0, then so can you with the resource A, 0, because the latter can 
be reduced back to 0. 
Then, the justification for forbidding the contraction rule is that you cannot use more 
resources than you possess. The justification for forbidding the weakening rule sounds 
more odd: you have to use all the resources you possess. 
Our logic of effective truth, too, is “resource conscious”, and this is a natural con- 
sequence of the game-semantical approach. 
Sentences in the classical logic are “static”, they are given one of the two values 
0 or 1, once and for ever. That’s why a (sub)sentence, occurring more than once in a 
sentence or a sequent, is still, in all reasonable senses, the same in each occurrence; 
the quantity of these occurrences does not matter, and the rule of contraction works. 
As for the game semantics, there sentences are treated as something dynamic; two 
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different occurrences of one and the same sentence denote one and the same game, 
i.e. one and the same set of potential plays, but in the process of playing up this game, 
the two occurrences can be realized as difSerent plays of one and the same game. This 
is just what makes, say, crncc different from c(. This is better illustrated by appealing 
again to chess. 
In the above example with the game CV-C Proponent’s winning strategy consisted 
in ensuring that the two occurrences of C in CVX were realized as one and the 
same play. However, this trick fails to work with the game CV(-KA--C), which 
is a game on three chessboards (chessboards NN 1,2 and 3, corresponding to the 
three occurrences of C, in their order from left to right). Kasparov can play differ- 
ent openings on the second and the third chessboards (where he plays white), and 
I can now only ensure that the play on the first chessboard coincides with the play 
on one of the chessboards N2 or N3, let it be N2. Then Kasparov can win on the 
chessboards NN 1 and 3 and, although I will have won on the chessboard N2, the 
whole play will be lost by me, because for winning CV(XAX) it was necessary 
for me to win on the first chessboard or to win on both the second and the third 
chessboards. 
Not only do resource-conscious effects arise as a consequence of the game-semantical 
approach, but our game semantics apparently has a chance to claim that it is a 
formalization of the intuitive “resource semantics”. Let us speculate a little bit on 
this. 
The things we call “resources” in everyday life are different in their nature: these 
can be, say, money, or electrical energy, or time and space (for computational opera- 
tions). The feature which seems to be common for most things we call resources is that 
a resource is something necessary and/or enough for getting (achieving, accomplishing, 
obtaining, converting into) something. This suggests the first idea on the way of build- 
ing a resource semantics: A resource must be characterized by the set of the things 
into which it can be converted. 
To proceed, let us consider some examples. The style of most examples below is 
rather standard and Girard is the author of the sort of philosophy they support. 
Today, in the situation of economic chaos which has followed the collapse of the 
USSR, two currencies are circulating in the ex-Soviet Republic of Georgia (my home 
country): Russian Rubles (RR) and Georgian coupons (GC). They are not easily con- 
vertible into each other, and it is even more problematic to convert them into dollars. 
However, if you are lucky enough to have a few dollars, you will have no prob- 
lems converting them into rubles or coupons - any bank would buy dollars from you, 
offering for 1 dollar 1000 rubles or 1000 000 coupons - whichever you like. 
Thus, the following two implications are true: 
l If you have $1, then you can get 1OOORR. 
l If you have $1, then you can get 1000 OOOGC. 
But is then the sentence 
l If you have $1, then you can get 1OOORR and you can get 1000 OOOGC 
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true? Well, according to the classical logic it certainly is, but in the everyday language 
the above sentence, which could be shortened as 
Zf you have $1, then you can get 1OOORR and 1000 OOOGC, 
would be more likely understood as that if you have $1, then you can get both 1OOORR 
and 1000 OOOGC so that you can put the rubles into one pocket and the coupons into 
another. In this case the above implication is not true: you need $2 rather than $1 
in the antecedent. Just at this point we arrive at the idea of considering two sorts of 
conjunction-like operations on resources: A and A. To have the resource A A B means 
to have an option to convert it either into A or into B - whichever you like, but only 
one of them. And to have the resource A ll B means something more: It means to 
have both resources A and B and to be able to spend each of them its own way. Thus, 
having l$ implies having the resource 1OOORR A 1000 OOOGC, but not the resource 
1 OOORR LL 1000 OOOGC. 
Although coupons are the only legal currency in Georgia, because of the hyper- 
inflation most people prefer to have rubles rather than coupons. The government still 
tries to strengthen coupons. It is not forbidden to accept rubles, but at least in the state- 
owned stores the salesmen are obliged to also accept coupons if the customer prefers 
to pay them instead of rubles by the rate 1RR = 1000GC. For example, a salesman 
who is selling a bottle of wine can get for it 1000 rubles or 1000 000 coupons, but 
he can never know which of these two. This situation describes the disjunction-like 
operator V on resources. The sentence 
l Zf the salesman has 1 bottle of wine, then he can get 1OOORRV 1 OOOOOOGC 
is true, whereas both the sentences 
l Zf the salesman has 1 bottle of wine, then he can get 1OOORR 
and 
l If the salesman has 1 bottle of wine, then he can get 1000 OOOGC, 
where “can get” means “will get if wants” are false. We can see at this point that 
a resource cannot be fully characterized by the set of the things into which it can 




l 1 bottle of wine, 
whereas the first resource is evidently stronger than the second. What makes different 
these two resources is the nature of this conversion. If I am the possessor, in the first 
case it is me who chooses between 1OOORR and 1000 OOOGC, but in the second case 
it is not me. This is what makes the possessor of l$ richer than the possessor of a 
bottle of wine. 
Thus, a resource is characterized by two parameters: (1) the set of objects into 
which the resource can be immediately converted and (2) one of the two labels - say, 
0 and 1, where the label 0 indicates that the object into which the resource will be 
converted is chosen by the possessor of the resource, and the label 1 indicates that 
94 G. JaparidzeJAnnals of Pure and Applied Logic 85 (1997) 87-156 
this choice is done by “somebody else”. We can notice now that we have come to 
a game understanding of resources: resources are nothing but positions of a game; 
‘A can be immediately converted into B” means that the transfer from the position A 
to the position B is a legal move; finally, the label 0 (resp. 1) for A means that it is 
Proponent’s (resp. Opponent’s) move in the position A. 
Usually, a resource is considered as just a means for achieving some goal, and the 
value of a resource is associated only with its potential convertibility into a (the) goal. 
We can consider goals as special sort of resources which cannot or should not be any 
more converted into anything else. If a resource is not a goal but, like a goal, is not 
any more convertible into anything, then it is a dead end: anyone who has reached 
a dead end has missed the possibility to reach a (the) goal. 
Example. The goal is to get rid of my headache, and I have the resource of 1% for that 
purpose. I can convert this dollar into an aspirin, then, taking it, I can “convert” the 
latter into its effect on the organism. If this relieves my headache, the goal is achieved. 
Otherwise I am at the situation of a dead end: the resources are spent, but the goal is 
missed. 
We associate the label 1 with goals and the label 0 with dead ends. Reaching a goal 
means winning the play, and hitting a dead end means losing it. The purely “game” 
intuition behind this condition of losing a play is that the label 1 not only is Proponent’s 
privilege to choose the next move, but it is also his duty to do so; however, at a dead 
end Proponent cannot carry out this duty because there are no more possible moves. 
The intuition behind the condition of winning a game is symmetric. 
Which resources do we accept as “good”? - Just those which can ultimately be 
converted into goals. “Can be converted” here means that there is a (Proponent’s) 
strategy which guarantees reaching a goal. And it is natural to require such a strategy 
to be effective. 
We have not yet mentioned negation as an operator on resources. The intuition behind 
the negation -A of a resource A can be characterized by saying that the following two 
acts are equivalent: 
l to spend A; 
l to get YA. 
A few more words about the operator A. Its exact behavior will be defined in Section 3, 
and it will be seen from that definition that in general D works as an operator that 
“adds up” resources, so that l$nl$ is equal to something like 2$. However, if A is a 
terminal resource such as a goal or a dead end, then our treatment of n will yield the 
equivalence of ALlA and A. This should not confuse us. For, e.g., the situation 
No more headache A No more headache 
is not any “better” than simply 
No more headache. 
They both mean nothing but that my goal of getting rid of the headache is achieved. 
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As for 1.U l$, it is “better” than l$ because it can be converted into aspirinA 
Tylenol, and taking two different headache medicines gives me more chance to achieve 
the goal of no more headache. 
I mentioned above that the logic of effective truth is a proper extension of BCK, 
on the other hand, it is strictly included in classical logic, where the language of the 
latter is meant to be augmented with V and A, which are thought of as synonyms of 
v and A, respectively. 
The nice fact is that the logic of effective truth, in the full language, turns out to 
be decidable (in polynomial space), both at the propositional and the predicate levels, 
which contrasts with the undecidability of classical predicate logic. This is the focal 
result of the present work and its proof takes about 70% of the rest of the paper. 
One more thing is worth mentioning here. As soon as we remove the requirement 
of effectiveness for Proponent’s strategies in our games and allow any strategies, we 
get classical logic, where the distinction between the additive and the multiplicative 
versions of disjunction and conjunction simply disappears. Thus, classical logic and 
our variant of “linear logic” result from two special cases of one general semantical 
approach. 
In the end, some historical remarks. Apparently, Lorenzen [6] was the first to in- 
troduce a game semantics, in the late 1950s. He suggested that the meaning of a 
proposition should be specified by establishing the rules of treating it in a debate 
(game) between a proponent who asserts the proposition and an opponent who denies 
it. 
Lorenzen’s approach describes logical validity exclusively in terms of rules without 
appealing to any kind of truth values for atoms, and this makes the semantics somewhat 
vicious (to my mind) as it looks more like just a “pure” syntax rather than a semantics. 
Subsequently, a lot of more work on game semantics was done by Lorenz [5], 
Hintikka and his group [7], and a number of other authors. 
The notion of effective truth introduced in this paper, though defined in game- 
semantical terms, is in fact more similar to, say, Kleene’s [4] recursive realizabil- 
ity, specifically, in what concerns the treatment of additive connectives and quantifiers 
(which are nothing but additives, again). At the same time, the predicate of recursive 
realizability is nonarithmetical, whereas the predicate of effective truth of an arithmeti- 
cal sentence (where the latter is allowed to contain multiplicative connectives along 
with additives) has the complexity Zt. 
In comparison of recursive realizability and effective truth should be added that 
not all the recursively realizable sentences are true in the classical sense (e.g. some 
sentences of the form +x(&x) V T$(x)) are recursively realizable), whereas effective 
truth is only a “strong version” of classical truth. 
I elaborated this semantics some time before writing the present paper, and presented 
it in the talk “The logic of effective truth” at the Logic and Computer Science con- 
ference in Marseille (June 1992). At the same conference I met Andreas Blass and 
learned that he had found - earlier than I - a very similar semantics. It is described 
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in his remarkable paper [2], where the decidability of the following two fragments of 
the corresponding logic is established: 
1. The multiplicative propositional fragment, i.e. the fragment that uses only the 
connectives 1, V and A. 
2. The fragment consisting of additive, i.e. V- and &free, sequents (a sequent 
(&, , &J is thought of as the formula 410 . . . 04,). 
However, the question whether the unrestricted logic corresponding to Blass’s se- 
mantics (or, at least, the full propositional fragment of it) is decidable, recursively 
enumerable or even arithmetical, has not been answered so far. 
Both fragments above coincide with the corresponding fragments of our logic of 
effective truth, and most likely this holds for the whole logic, too. 
Together with the similarity between the two semantics, related with essentially iden- 
tical treatments of logical connectives as operations on games, there are considerable 
differences between Blass’s and our approaches and, especially, the consequences of 
these approaches: 
1. Our games are finite (every play has a finite length, that is), whereas Blass’s games 
are infinite and this fact plays a crucial role in all partial completeness proofs in [2].4 
This infiniteness makes things only second-order definable, while all the theory of our 
games of bounded depth, including the completeness proof for the logic of effective 
truth, can be formalized in Peano Arithmetic. 
2. At the same time, Blass’s semantics does not require that Proponent’s strategies 
be effective, whereas that requirement is the spirit of all our approach and its “construc- 
tivistic” effect is for us the main philosophical and practical motivation for introducing 
a nonclassical semantics. 
3. The finiteness of our plays makes definitions simpler and more natural. For ex- 
ample, a play is assumed to be lost by the player who has to move in the last position 
of the play, so we do not need a special parameter indicating which plays are won by 
which player in a game. 
4. The notion of effective truth is only a strengthening of the classical notion of truth, 
and it is based on the traditional models for traditional languages. For example, the 
standard model of arithmetic now becomes the unique game-semantical model where 
each atomic sentence CI is a terminal position, with Opponent’s obligation to move 
(which is though impossible to do), if ~1 is true in the standard model, and Proponent’s 
obligation to move otherwise. The set of effectively true arithmetical sentences is a 
proper subset of the set of those true in the classical sense. 5 As for Blass’s approach, 
4 For example, the proof of nonvalidity of d( V -a in [Z] uses a counterexample where a is an undetermined 
game, i.e. a game where none of the players has a winning strategy, and such a proof fails as soon as a 
is interpreted as a finite game because finite games are always determined when noneffective strategies are 
allowed. 
‘For example, if a is a Ilt arithmetical sentence which asserts its own not being effectively true, then 
a V -a is true but not effectively true. Indeed, if we suppose that this additive disjunction is effectively true, 
a little analysis of our treatment of V shows that then either CI or -c( should be effectively true. A further 
analysis of the situation reveals that in both cases we would then get an effectively true sentence which is 
classically false. 
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it hardly allows to speak about truth in the standard model of arithmetic, for, in order 
to maintain the difference between classical and game-semantical truth, atoms need to 
be interpreted as infinite games there, and then it is not clear what game should be a 
natural interpretation of, say, a + b = c. 
Abramsky and Jagadeesan [l] revised Blass’s game semantics by modifying game 
rules, and investigated the multiplicative fragment of the corresponding logic, which 
does not validate weakening any more and is thus closer to the original Girard’s linear 
logic, being still stronger than the latter. This fragment is shown to be decidable, though 
the question on decidability of the whole logic, as well as of its full propositional 
fragment, remains open. 
2. Basic notions and facts on games 
Definition 2.1. A net of games is a triple N = (W, I, R), where: 
l W is a nonempty, countable, decidable set, the elements of which are called positions 
of N. 
l I is an effective function W + (0, l}, called the labeling function; for an element 
w of W, the value of l(w) is called the label of w. Intuitively, I(w) = 0 means that 
Proponent has to move and l(w) = 1 means that Opponent has to move. 
l R is a decidable binary relation, called the development relation, on W such that 
the converse of R is well-founded, i.e. there is no infinite chain woRwlRw2 . . . of 
positions. Intuitively, wRu means that the transfer from the position w to the position 
u is a legal move. In this case u is called a devezopment of w (in N). R(w) usually 
denotes the set of all developments of w. 
Terminology 2.2. Let N = (W, 1, R) be a net of games. 
1. By a legal N-sequence we will mean any sequence of positions of N such that 
each (n+ 1 )th term of the sequence (if it exists) is a development of the nth term. Thus, 
the converse well-foundedness of R means nothing but that each legal N-sequence is 
finite. 
2. Let w,u E W. We say that u is an rt-development of w (in N), if the reflexive 
and transitive closure of R holds between w and u. 
For e E (0, 11, we say that u is an rt-e-development of w, if there is a legal N- 
sequence us,. . . , v, (n 3 0) of positions such that us = w, v, = u and for each i with 
0 <i < n, vi has the label e. 
Thus, rt-e-development is a special case of rt-development. 
3. As label 0 means Proponent’s move and label 1 means Opponent’s move, we 
will use the terms O-Player and I-Player as synonyms of Proponent and Opponent, 
respectively. 
Definition 2.3. A game is a quadruple G = ( W, I, R,s), where N = ( W, 1, R) is a net 
of games and s is an element of W. Usually, if N denotes a net ( W, I, R) of games 
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and s E W, we use N(s) to denote the game ( W, 1, R, s). “A position of N(s)” and “a 
position of N” are synonyms, and s is said to be the starting position of N(s). 
By a legal G-sequence we then mean any legal N-sequence whose first term is s. 
Convention 2.4. It is not a “legal move” to speak about a function without specifying 
its type, as this is often done in this paper (e.g., Definitions 2.5, 2.8, 2.9). However, 
sometimes the type of a function really does not matter or can be seen from the context, 
and it would be awkward to still indicate, in each such case, a range and a domain 
for a function purely out of reasons of a correct style. 
In order to avoid possible confusion caused by our irresponsible usage of the notion 
of function, let us fix a “large enough” universe U; namely, we assume that the set of 
positions of any game we consider is included in U; for safety we can suppose that 
all natural numbers (and maybe many other things) are in U. Then 
l by a function, if not specified otherwise, we will always mean a partial function of 
the type U + U; 
l by a jnite function we will mean a function (in the above sense) defined only for 
a finite number of arguments. 
Definition 2.5. Let G = ( W, 1, R,s) be a game and fa and fi be functions. 
1. The G-play with Proponent’s trategy fo and Opponent’s trategy fl is a se- 
quence P of positions of N which we construct in the following way: 
(a) The first position of P is s. 
(b) Suppose the first n positions of P are WI,. . . , w,, and e is the label of w,,. Then: 
l if fe is defined for W, and fe(wn) = u for some u with w,,Ru, then the (n + 1)th 
position of P is u; 
l otherwise w, is the last position of P. 
Notice that P is a legal G-sequence and thus P is finite. 
2. A G-play is the G-play with Proponent’s strategy f and Opponent’s strategy g 
for some functions f and g. 
Observe that a G-play is nothing but a legal G-sequence. 
3. A G-play with e-Player’s strategy f (where e E (0, l}, see Terminology 2.2(3)) 
is the G-play with e-Player’s strategy f and (1 - e)-Player’s strategy g for some 
function g. 
In other words, a G-play with e-Player’s strategy f is a legal G-sequence (wi(= 
s), . . . , w,) such that for any 1 d i < n with I(wi) = e, we have: 
l if f(wi) = u for some u E R(wi), then i < n and wi+i = u; 
l otherwise i = n. 
Definition 2.6. The depth of a game N(s) = (W, 1, R,s) is the least ordinal number c( 
such that for every w with SRW, a > the depth of N(w). Thus, ifs has no develop- 
ments, the depth of N(s) is 0. 
Very roughly, the depth of a game G is the maximal possible length of a G-play. 
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Definition 2.7. Suppose G is a game, P is a G-play, w is the last position of P and e 
is the label of w. Then we say that P is lost by e-Player and won by (1 - e)-Player. 
Simply the words “won” and “lost”, without specifying the player, will always mean 
“won by Proponent” and “lost by Proponent”. 
Thus, every play is either won or lost. Intuitively, a play is won if a position (the 
last position) is reached where Opponent has to move (as the label of that position is 
1) but cannot, and in a lost play we have the dual situation: Proponent has to move 
but cannot. 
Definition 2.8. Let G be a game. 
l A solution to G (Proponent’s winning strategy for G) is a function f such that 
every G-play with Proponent’s strategy f is won. 
l Dually, an antisolution to G (Opponent’s winning strategy for G) is a function g 
such that every G-play with Opponent’s strategy g is lost. 
Taking into account that the development relation is converse well founded, the 
following Fact 2.9 can be considered as a correct alternative definition of the notion 
of solution; the form of this definition suggests that the relation “. . .is a solution to 
. ” applied later to formulas interpreted as games, belongs to the family of relations 
of the type “. . .realizes . . .” which lead to diverse well-known concepts of realizability 
(see PI). 
Fact 2.9 (Another definition of the notion of solution). A function f is a solution to 
a game N(s) = ( W, 1, R, s) z$ the following holds: 
(a) if I(s) = 1, then for all w E R(s), f is a solution to the game N(w); 
(b) if Z(s) = 0, then f(s) = w for some position w such that w E R(s) and f is u 
solution to the game N(w). 
Proving that the above two definitions of solution are equivalent would be an easy 
warming-up exercise for the reader. 
Fact 2.10. A function f is a solution to a game G tf and only tffor any finite function 
(see Convention 2.4) g, the G-play with Proponent’s strategy f and Opponent’s 
strategy g is won. 
Proof. Taking Definition 2.8 as the basic definition of solution, the “only if” direction 
is trivial. For the “if” direction, suppose f is not a solution to G, i.e. there is a function 
h such that the G-play P with Proponent’s strategy f and Opponent’s strategy h is 
lost. Let then g be the function which coincides with h for the positions that partici- 
pate in P and is undefined for any other object. Clearly, the G-play with Proponent’s 
strategy f and Opponent’s strategy g is the selfsame P. On the other hand, since P (as 
well as any legal G-sequence) is finite, the function g is finite. Thus, g is a finite 
function such that the G-play with Proponent’s strategy f and Opponent’s strategy g 
is lost. 0 
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Definition 2.11. 
l A game is said to be solvable, if it has a solution. 
l A game is said to be efictiuely solvable, if it has an effective (recursive) solution. 
A solution, defined in Definition 2.8, is a function of current position and it does 
not see previous moves (the history of the play). However, in some situations it 
is more convenient to deal with a strategy which scans the whole initial segment 
of the play rather than the last position. Such strategies will be called “history- 
sensitive”. 
Definition 2.12. Let G = ( W, I, R, s) be a game and f be a function. A G-play with 
Proponent’s history-sensitive strategy f is a legal G-sequence (WI,. . .,w,,) such that 
for every i <n with l(wi) = 0 we have 
0 if f(wt,..., wi) = u and WiRu, then i < n and wi+t = U; 
l otherwise i = n. 
Definition 2.13. A history-sensitive solution to a game G is a function f such that 
any G-play with Proponent’s history-sensitive strategy f is won. 
Theorem 2.14. (I) A game has a solution ifs it has a history-sensitive solution. 
(2) A game has has an eflective solution $f it has an effective history-sensitive 
solution. 
Proof. We prove here only the clause 2 of the theorem. The proof of the clause 1 is 
simpler. 
Consider a game G = ( W, 1, R, s). 
(+) Suppose f is an effective solution to G. Let g be the function defined by 
d(v,..., wn)) = f(wn). Evidently, g is then an effective history-sensitive solution 
to G. 
(+) Suppose g is an effective history-sensitive solution to G and Mg is a machine 
that computes g. 
l Let a good sequence mean a legal G-sequence (wt,...,w,) such that for any 
1 <i < n, if l(wi) = 0, then g(wt ,..,, w,) = Wi+t. 
As W,l,R and g are recursive, the good sequences can be recursively enumerated. So, 
let us fix a recursive list of good sequences. 
Let now f be a partial recursive function the value of which for an element w of 
W is computed by the following machine Mf : 
l First, My checks (from the beginning) the list of good sequences till the moment 
when a good sequence (t,, . . . , te) is found such that te = w. Then Mf simulates the 
machine Mg with (t,, . . , tJ on the input of the latter; if M, halts and gives the 
output u for some u E R(w), then Mf gives the same output U. 
The claim is that f is a solution to G. To show this, suppose, for a contradiction, 
that there is a lost G-play (WI,. . . , w,) with Proponent’s strategy f. Let us first verify 
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by induction on i that 
for any l<i< n, there is a good sequence whose last term is wi. (1) 
This is trivial for i = 1 because wi = s and (s) is a good sequence. Suppose now 
i > 1. Then, by the induction hypothesis, there is a good sequence (~1,. . . , u,) with 
u m= Wi_ 1. If /(urn) = 1, then obviously (~1,. . . , u,,,,wi) is a good sequence. Suppose 
now that l(u,) = 0, i.e. Z(Wi_1) = 0. Then, as (WI ,... , w,) is a G-play with Proponent’s 
strategy f, we have wi = f(wi_1). According to the definition of f, this means that 
for some good sequence (vi,. . . ,~k) with uk = Wi_1, we have g((vi,...,ak)) = Wi. But 
then (ui,... , vk, Wi) is a good sequence, and (1) is proved. 
Thus, by (1 ), there is a good sequence (tl, . . . , te) with te = w,. We may suppose 
that (tl,. . . , te) is the first good sequence in the list of good sequences whose last term 
is w,. 
Observe that (tl , . . , te) (as well as any good sequence) is an initial segment of 
some G-play P with Proponent’s history-sensitive strategy g. Since I(&) = 0 and g is 
a history-sensitive solution to G, te cannot be the last position of P, i.e. we must have 
g(tl, . , te) = Y for some Y E R(t,) = R(w,). But then, by the definition of f, we have 
f(w,) = Y E R(w,), which contradicts our assumption that w, is the last position of a 
G-play (namely of (WI, . . . , wn)) with Proponent’s strategy f : at least, the position Y 
must follow w, in this play. The theorem is proved. 0 
Lemma 2.15. Suppose N(s) = (W, l,R,s) is a game such that Z(s) = 1 and for each 
u E R(s), N(u) is solvable. Then N(s) is solvable. 
Proof. For each u E R(s), let us fix a solution gU to N(u). We define a function f and 
show that it is a history-sensitive solution to N(s). By Theorem 2.14, that will mean 
that there is a solution to N(s). So, for any u E R(s) and vi,. . . , v, with vi = U, n > 1, 
let 
f (&VI,. ..,h) = su(v,>. 
Any N(s)-play with Proponent’s history-sensitive strategy f looks like (s, ~1,. . , vn), 
where, unless n = 0, we have vi = u for some u E R(s). Observe that if such a play 
is lost, then (n # 0 and) (~1,. . , v,) is a lost N(u)-play with Proponent’s strategy g,,. 
But this is impossible because g,, is a solution to N(u). q 
What follows is in fact, a well-known theorem which is due to Zermelo: 
Theorem 2.16. To any game there is either a solution or an antisolution, i.e. exactly 
one of the players has a winning strategy. 
Proof. Before we start proving, note that almost all the definitions and facts on games 
enjoy perfect duality: we can always interchange “solution” and “antisolution”, “Pro- 
ponent” and “Opponent”, “0” and “l”, “won” and “lost”. 
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Fix a game N(s) = (I?‘, E, R, s). 
First observe that both players cannot have winning strategies for N(s), for otherwise 
the play corresponding to these two strategies should be simultaneously won and lost, 
which is impossible. 
Let h be the depth (see Definition 2.6) of N(s). We may suppose that every w E W 
is an rt-development (see Terminology 2.2(2)) of s, which means that the depth of 
N(w) for any w with s # w E W is less than h. 
By induction on depths <h we are going to show that for an arbitrary element w 
of IV, one of the players has a winning strategy for N(w). Before using induction, we 
consider four cases and show that in each of them one of the players has a winning 
strategy. 
Case 1: Z(w) = 0 and there is u E R(w) such that Proponent has a winning strategy 
g for N(u). 
Let then f(w) = u and for any w # v E W, f(v) = g(v). Since w can never appear 
in an N(u)-play (because of the converse well-foundedness of R), it is clear that f is 
a solution to N(u), whence, by Fact 2.9, f is a solution to N(w). 
Case 2: Z(w) = 1 and there is u E R(w) such that Opponent has a winning strategy 
g for N(u). 
Dual to the previous case: we can define an antisolution f to N(w). 
Case 3: I(w) = 1 and for any u E R(w) there is a solution to N(u). 
Then, by Lemma 2.15, there is a solution to N(w). 
Case 4: Z(w) = 0 and for any u E R(w) there is an antisolution to N(u). 
Dual to the case 3, with the conclusion that there is an antisolution to N(w). 
Now it remains to show that one of the above cases always takes place. Indeed: 
Suppose I(w) = 0 and the case 4 is “not the case”, i.e. there is u E R(w) such that 
N(u) has no antisolution. Since the depth of N(u) is less than the depth of N(w), we 
can apply the induction hypothesis to N(u) and conclude that Proponent has a winning 
strategy for N(u), i.e. we deal with the case 1. 
Suppose now l(w) = 1 and the case 3 does not take place, i.e. there is u E R(w) such 
that N(u) has no solution. Then, by the induction hypothesis, there is an antisolution 
to N(u), which means that we deal with the case 2. 0 
3. Sentences as games 
Terminology and Notation 3.1. (1) By a “language” in this paper we mean a classical 
first order language without functional or individual symbols supplemented with the two 
additional binary connectives V and A. 
More precisely, a language is determined (and thus can be identified with) a count- 
able set of predicate letters together with a function which assigns to each predicate 
letter P a natural number n called the arity of P (and P is then said to be nary). 
Besides, the alphabet of each language consists of: 
l Individual variables: ~1, v2,v3,. . .; we use x, y,z . _ . as metavariables for them. 
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l Propositional connectives: 7 (negation), V (additive disjunction), A (additive con- 
junction), V (multiplicative disjunction), n (multiplicative conjunction). 
l Quantifiers: 3 (existential quantifier), V (universal quantifier). 
l Technical signs: , (comma), ( (left parenthesis), ) (right parenthesis). 
(2) Throughout the paper L denotes some fixed language. 
(3) We define the set of literals of L as the union of the sets of positive and negative 
literals of L, defined as follows: 
0 CI is a positive literal of L, if a = P(xl, . . . ,xn), where P is an n-ary predicate letter 
and xi , . . . ,x, are variables (if n = 0, then P(xl,. . . ,xn) is just P). 
0 c( is a negative literal of L, if a = -p for some positive literal /3 of L. 
The word “atom” will be used as a synonym of “positive literal”. 
(4) Formulas of L are the elements of the smallest class FmL of expressions such 
that, saying “N is a formula of L” for “a E FmL”, we have: 
0 Literals of L are formulas of L. 
l If c( and p are formulas of L, then (a) V (p), (a) A (/3), (a)O(&, (a) A (/3) are 
formulas of L. 
l If a is a formula of L and x is a variable, then 3x(a) and Vx(a) are formulas of L. 
We often omit some parentheses in formulas, when this does not lead to any ambi- 
guity. 
(5) Thus, in the formal language we prefer to restrict the scope of 7 only to atoms. 
However, we introduce la for complex formulas as an abbreviation defined as follows: 
0 7(7a) =df a 
l 7(a V j3) =df Ta A -b 
0 ~(aA/?)=df~aV~j? 
0 -J(aop) =df la n -fl 
0 l(a n fi) =df YaVlfi 
l -, (%a) =df tlxla 
l -(ba) =df hTa. 
(6) Formulas a and la are said to be opposite to each other. 
(7) We define a free occurrence of a variable x in a formula in the usual way: this 
is an occurrence of x that is not in the scope of an occurrence of h or kc. 
(8) We will often use the standard notational convention: a formula /I can be 
denoted by /?(xi, . . ,x,,), where xi,. . . , x, are any variables (not all of them have to 
occur free in ,!3 and not all the free variables of /I have to be among them). Then 
B(t 1,. . . , t,,), where the ti’s are variables or any other terms (see below), denotes 
the result of substituting tl , . . . , tn for all free occurrences of xi,. . .,x,, respectively, 
in p. 
(9) A closed formula or a sentence is a formula without free occurrences of vari- 
ables. 
(10) Suppose 9 is a nonempty countable set (of “individuals”). A formula of L 
with parameters in 2 is a pair (a,f), where a is a formula of L and f is a (finite) 
function V’ -+ 9 for some subset V’ of the set V of free variables of a; if V’ = V, 
then we deal with a sentence of L with parameters in 9. 
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We can think of sentences with parameters in 9 as formulas in which some free vari- 
ables are “substituted by elements of 9”, and write, e.g., ~(a,, . . . , a,) for (a(~,, . . . J,,), 
f), if f(xl) = ~1, . . ., S(h) = a,. 
(11) We can use the words “literal” and “atom” for formulas (that is, literals or 
atoms) with parameters, too. If such a literal is a sentence, then we call it a sliteral. 
Definition 3.2. A model for L is a triple J%’ = (9.4, Ed, 92~) such that 
l 9~ is a nonempty countable decidable set, called the domain of individuals; 
l T/H is an effective total function of type {atomic sentences of L with parameters in 
2~) + (0, l}, called the prelabeling function; 
l .%?)M is a decidable converse well-founded binary relation on {atomic sentences of L 
with parameters in G&}, called the predevelopment relation. 
Definition 3.3. A model JS’ is said to be elementary, if the relation 5%~ is empty. 
Definition 3.4. Let J@ be a model for L. We define 
the net of games induced by A, as follows: 
l WA is the set of all sentences of L with parameters in 9~. 
0 1. G(U) = 8, (a), if a is an atom; 
2. C(a v p) = ,!&(%U) = 0; 
3. Ir(cr A p) = IA(VXxcI) = 1; 
4. In/(%) = 1 - [a(a); 
5. 1.~4 (aoB> = max{b (a), I.A (B)}; 
6. b(a n P) = min{l,da), b(B)}. 
l ~RAI/ iff one of the following holds: 
1. 4, $ are atoms and ~$9~~ $; 
2. cp=cr*8,where*~{V,A),and~==or1/1=p; 
3. C#J = *XCI(X), where * E (3, V}, and 11/ = a(a) for some a E 9~; 
4. C$ = 1~1, ccR.~cx’ for some CC’ and @ = 1~‘; 
5. 4 = LX * p, where * E {o,n}, and: 
- 1~ (E) = 1~ (c$), crRd CI’ for some CI’ and $ = 01’ * 8, or 
- 12(P) = I&(4), /3R_~j3’ for some 8’ and $ = a * 8’. 
Now we can see how sentences are to be interpreted as games: given a model JC? for 
L, each sentence a of L is understood as the game i?~ (a). This game can be referred 
to as “the game corresponding to CC”, or, simply, “the game CY” instead of N&(a). 
The games of type NA(E) we call linguistic games. 
The standard model of arithmetic defined below is an example of elementary model. 
There are many versions, equivalent in expressive power, of the language of arith- 
metic. Here we choose one of them with infinitely many predicate letters: 
Qo,Ql,Qz, 
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In particular, let Oef, Oefi, Def,, . . . be the enumeration, by increasing GGdel numbers, 
of all primitive recursive definitions of relations. And let 
&RI,&,... 
be the relations defined by DefO, Def,, Def2,. . . , respectively. Then, if n is the arity of 
Rj, we associate the same arity n with the predicate letter Qj. Each predicate letter 
Qi is interpreted as (“represents”) the relation Ri, as this interpretation is set by the 
following definition of the standard model of arithmetic: 
Definition 3.5. The standard model of arithmetic, denoted by 9’ throughout this paper, 
is the following elementary model (@P,~~,s): 
9,~ is the set NAT = (0, 1,2, . . .} of natural numbers; 
for any i and any tuple al, . . . , a,, of natural numbers, where n is the arity of the 
predicate letter Qi, we have 
&(Q;(al,. . .,a,)) = 1 iff Ri(al,. . .,a,). 
Convention 3.6. By abuse of notation, if R denotes an n-ary primitive recursive relation 
in our metalanguage, we will use the same expression ‘R” in an arithmetical formula, 
instead of a predicate letter Qi which represents R. Of course, this practice induces 
ambiguity because R = Ri for infinitely many i’s (that is, infinitely many Qi’s repre- 
sent R). However, we can suppose that for each relation R we deal with, we choose 
one fixed Qi representing R, and everywhere in the text then “R” stands for this 
concrete Qi. 
This convention allows us to use standard notations for standard primitive recursive 
relations like “x < y”, “x + y = z”, “2X = y”, etc. without explaining their mean- 
ings, as this is done in the example below; each such expression is thought of as an 
atomic formula of the language of arithmetic. This allows us to pretend that in the 
arithmetical language we have terms for primitive recursive functions, and consider 
as formulas expressions like cc(h(y,z)), whenever CL(X) is a formula and h(y,z) is a 
function. Note that it is not the case that a(h(y,z)) contains some predicate H for the 
graph of h and looks like, say, 3t(H(y,z, t) A a(t)). Rather, U(X) and a(h(y,z)) have 
exactly the same logical structure; a(h(y,z)) is simply the result of replacing in U(X) 
each atom Q&z?& containing a free (in a) occurrence of x and representing some 
relation R(x, u’), by a (the) atom Qj(y,z, u’), representing the relation R(h(y,z), u’). So 
R(x, 12) and R(h(y,z), u’) simply denote two different atoms of two different (in this case) 
arities. 
The sequence of the following arithmetical sentences with parameters in NAT is 
a legal sequence of positions of NY, in fact a won play (for an explanation of the 
notation h$ see Definition 3.4): 
1. (0 = 1 vb’q3v2(u, = ~2)) A (~u,&I~(u~ + 212 = vz)V2=3); 
2. VU,!lVZ(Ui = u2) n @u,v&(u, + 02 = u2)V2 = 3); 
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3. Vu,3u2(01 = 02) n (Vi&(0 + U2 = u2)V2 = 3); 
4. &( 124 = 02) n (&(0 + u2 = u2)v2 = 3); 
5. 124 = 124 n (Vu2(0 + u2 = u2)V2 = 3); 
6. 124=124~(0+18=1802=3). 
Why did not we restrict our considerations to only elementary models, what do 
we need the predevelopment relation for? In elementary models atoms are interpreted 
as very specific games - games of depth 0, which are always trivially solvable or 
antisolvable, whereas we need to be able to interpret atoms as any possible games. 
SulIice it to say that otherwise the logic corresponding to our semantics would not be 
closed under the substitution rule. For example, when we deal with elementary models, 
the game MVTZ is always effectively solvable for an atomic LX, but it may be effectively 
unsolvable for tl = kc3yVz’zp. Besides, any net of games can be completely captured by 
our models (but hardly by elementary models), and then the logical operators appear as 
operations on games. For example, one of the straightforward ways of “capturing” such 
a net (IV, 1,R) is to interpret by its positions WO, WI,. . . the atomic sentences Po,Pt , . . . 
(or P(O),P( l), . . . . . . ), defining the value of the prelabeling function for P,, to be equal 
to E(w,) and stipulating that the predevelopment relation holds between P,, and P,,, iff 
w,Rw,. 
4. Truth and effective truth 
Identifying V with v and n with A, we can think of L as a classical first-order 
language. A model in classical logic is understood as a pair JX = (9, Y), where 9 
is a nonempty set (domain of individuals) and $9 is a function which assigns to each 
n-ary predicate letter P of the language an n-ary relation ‘9’ on 9. Then for a sentence 
tl of L with parameters in 9, the classical value of a in JY, denoted by Cv~(a), is 
defined by the following induction on the complexity: 
l for an atom P(al,..., a,), CVA(P(a, ,..., a,)) = 1, if @‘(al ,..., a,) holds, and 
CIG(P(at,..., a,,)) = 0 otherwise; 
0 C&(-a) = 1 - Cb((cI); 
0 CV,(a V j3) = CV!(ctOj?) = max{(CV~(cr),CG(P)}; 
0 CV,(cr A /I) = C&(0! a /I) = min{CV~(a),Cl%(/?)}; 
0 CV$r(Zkua(~)) = max{CV!(a(a)) : a E 9}; 
0 CI&(Vxxcr(x)) = min{CI&(U(a)) : a E 9}. 
Definition 4.1. Let &’ be a model for L. The classical model .A”’ = (9,3) induced 
by .A? is defined as follows: 
l 9=9A; 
l for any n-ary predicate letter P and any al,. . . , a,, E 9, we have 
@(aI , . . . ,a,) H (NA(P(al,. . . , a,,)) is solvable). 
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It is easily seen that if 4 is an elementary model, AC’ is the classical model induced 
by A! and DL is a positive sliteral (with parameters in 9~), then C&~,(a)=&(a). 
Theorem 4.2. Let A? be a model for L, AC be the classical model induced by JZ 
and 4 be a sentence of L with parameters in 9~. Then C&(4) = 1 iff the game 
NM(~) is solvable. 
Proof. (+:) Suppose Cbcl( 4) = 1 and show, by induction on the complexity of 4, 
that NA(~) is solvable. 
Case 1: 4 is an atom P(al,..., a,). C&(4) = 1 then means that $$(al,...,a,) 
holds, which, by Definition 4.1, means that N&4) is solvable. 
Case 2: 4 = la, where a is an atom. Then G&(a) = 0 # 1 and, by the induction 
hypothesis, NM(a) is not solvable. Then, by Theorem 2.16, N&(a) has an antisolu- 
tion g. Let then f be such a function that for any sentence y, f(y) = lg(ly) (we 
may suppose that g is defined for every sentence and its value is always a sentence). 
Now, it is easy to verify that f is a solution to NA(la), for, if ~1,. . . , yk is a lost 
NM(la)-play with Proponent’s trategy f, then 171,. . . , lyk is a won (by Proponent) 
NA(a)-play with Opponent’s trategy g, which is impossible because g is an antisolution 
to NM(a). 
Case 3: 4 = alVa2. Then max{Ck&(at),C&l(az)} = 1. We may suppose that 
CV,,,(a1)= 1. Then, by the induction hypothesis, there is a solution g to NA(a1). Let 
f (4) = aI and for any sentence y # 4, f(y) = g(y). We claim that f is a solution 
to NA(~). Indeed, suppose there is a lost NA(4)-play with Proponent’s trategy J It 
will look like (4,a1, ‘i;) for some (possibly empty) sequence 7 of sentences. Observe 
that then (al, ij) is a lost NA(ai)-play with Proponent’s trategy g, which is impossible 
because, according to our assumption, g is a solution to NA(a,). 
Case 4: 4 = a1 A a2. Then U&I (al ) = C&I (a2) = 1 and, by the induction hypothesis, 
both NA(al ) and NA(a2) are solvable. Now, since a1 and a2 are the only developments 
of 4, it follows by Lemma 2.15 that NM(~) is solvable. 
Case 5: 4 = alVa2. Then max{C&(al),CV,,~(az)} = 1. We may suppose that 
Cl&l(at ) = 1. By the induction hypothesis, there is a solution g to NA(al ). 
Let f be such a function that for any sentence fit VP,, f(PtVbz) = g(/3t )V/?Z. 
Intuitively, to play an NA(aiVaZ)-play with the strategy f, for Proponent, means that 
he plays, using strategy g, only in the left component of the multiplicative disjunction 
and does nothing in the right component. 
Suppose there is a lost N&(4)-play 
(where Bt Vyr = a1 Va2 = 4) with Proponent’s trategy J Let kt <. . . <km be all the 
numbers k in the interval 1 <k G n such that /$_I #Pk. Intuitively, kG{kl, . . . , k,} means 
that the position /&Vyk has appeared as a result of moving in the left component of the 
multiplicative disjunction; all the other positions appear as a result of Opponent’s move 
in the right component and they are not interesting for us. It is now easy to see that 
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(4,Pkl,...Y /?k,) isalostN ( )- 1 A cc1p ay with Proponent’s strategy g, which is impossible 
because g was Proponent’s winning strategy for NM(GLI ). Thus, no NA(+)-play with 
Proponent’s strategy f can be lost, f is a solution to NA($). 
Case 6: 4 = cx,&. Then CV&(ai) = CV,(az) = 1. By the induction hypothesis, 
there are solutions gi and g2 to N~(cri) and N&(Q), respectively. 
Let f be such a function that for any sentence /Ii&, 
l f(P~W2)=sl(PlVV2 if L&)=0; 
l f(P1M2>=hb2(B) if ld)=~. 
Intuition: For Proponent, to follow strategy f in an Nd(aik)-play means to use 
the strategy g1 in the first component of the multiplicative conjunction and the strategy 
g2 in the second component. 
Suppose there is a lost NA(4)-play 
(where PrAyi = crlk2 = 4) with Proponent’s strategy J As this play is lost, the 
label of its last position /Innyn is 0, i.e. one of the positions /Ins,, yn has the label 0. 
We may suppose that I&&) = 0. Let then ki <. . . <k, be all the numbers k in the 
interval 1 < k <n such that /k-i # /?k. Thus, k E {kl, . . . , km} means that the position 
/?kVyk has appeared as a result of moving in the left component of the multiplicative 
conjunction. Now it remains to verify, which can be easily done, that (c(i) & , . . . , &,) 
is a lost Nd(ai)-play with Proponent’s strategy gi, which is impossible because gi 
was Proponent’s winning strategy for N~(ori). This contradiction proves that f is a 
solution to Nd(@). 
Case 7: q5=3xa(x). Similar to the case 3. 
Case 8: 4 =V’xc@). Similar to the case 4. 
(+:) We have just shown that if C&(4) = 1, then there is a solution to Nd(&). In 
a symmetric way we can show that if CI&(~)=O (i.e., if CV,,,(4)# l), then there is 
an antisolution to N&(4), which rules out solvability of No. 0 
Thus, identifying models with the classical models induced by them, solvability and 
truth appear the same. The reader can easily verify (using Theorem 4.2) that, e.g., the 
following holds. 
Fact 4.3. An arithmetical sentence CI is true in the classical sense (in the classical 
standard model of arithmetic) if and only if NY(U) is solvable. 
Therefore, it is safe and natural to use the word “true” for “solvable”, as this usage 
is established in the first clause of the following definition. 
Definition 4.4. Let cz be a sentence of L and JZ be a model for L. 
l cx is said to be true in Jll, if the game N&(a) is solvable. 
l a is said to be effectively true in A, if the game No is effectively solvable. 
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5. Tautologies and effective tautologies 
Having different notions of truth, we can define different notions of tautology: 6 
Definition 5.1. Let a be a sentence of L. 
l CI is said to be a tautology, if c( is true in every model for L. 
l c( is said to be an efictive tautology, if M. is effectively true in every model for L. 
Theorem 5.4 below establishes that the usage of the traditional word “tautology” here 
is safe, for the set of tautologies in our sense coincides with the set of tautologies in 
the classical sense. In the third clause of that theorem is used the notion of arithmetical 
instance of a formula of L, which, roughly, means the result of substituting predicate 
letters of the formula by arithmetical formulas of the same arity. Here is a more precise 
definition. 
Definition 5.2. An arithmetical translation from a language L is a function r defined 
for some (not necessarily proper) subset S of the set of predicate letters of L such that 
r assigns to each nary predicate letter P ES an arithmetical formula r P = #(xl,, . . ,x,) 
(which may also contain parameters) with exactly it free variables. 
We say that a translation r is good for a formula 4 of L (4 may contain natural 
numbers as parameters), if z is defined for all predicate letters occurring in 4 and, for 
any such letter P, ZP does not contain quantifiers binding individual variables occurring 
in 4. 
“Translation for 4” means translation which is good for 4. 
If r is good for 4, we define the formula 6 by the following induction on subfor- 
mulas of 4: 
l for an atomic CI =P(tl, . . , t,,), where each ti is either a variable or a parameter and 
where zP=j?(xl ,..., xx), we have a’=jl(tl,..., t,); 
l (-4)‘=-(F), (40$)~=4~0$‘, where OE{A,V,V,A}, and (Qx~)’ = Qx(~‘), 
where QE (3,V). 
An arithmetical instance of Q, is 4’ for some translation r for 4. 
Let CL be the classical predicate logic in language L, where the two sorts of dis- 
junction and the two sorts of conjunction are understood as synonyms. 
Remark 5.3. By a straightforward induction on the complexity of a formula 
show that if a translation r is good for /3, then /3 and /P have exactly the 
variables. 
Theorem 5.4. For any sentence 4 of L, the following are equivalent: 
(i) 4ECL; 
p one can 
same free 
b Many authors use “tautology” to refer to valid formulas of propositional logic only, but for us VxP(x) -+ 
3xP(x) is a tautology, too. 
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(ii) f$ is a tautology; 
(iii) any arithmetical instance of 4 is true in the standard model of arithmetic. 
Proof. (i)+(ii): Suppose 4 is not a tautology, i.e. Cp is not true in some model M. 
Then, according to Theorem 4.2, the classical value of 4 is 0 in the classical model 
JP’ induced by A, whence, by Giidel’s completeness theorem for CL, 4 @CL. 
(ii)+(iii): This immediately follows from Lemma 9.2(a), proved later in Section 9. 
(iii)+(i): It is a well-known fact that if 4$?‘CL, then there is an arithmetical instance 
(p* of (b whose classical value in the classical standard model of arithmetic is 0. This 
fact can be easily seen, say, by an analysis of Henkin’s proof of Giidel’s completeness 
theorem for CL. And this, by Fact 4.3, means nothing but that 4* is not true (in our 
sense) in the standard model of arithmetic. 0 
The following Theorem 5.5, which is an analog of Theorem 5.4, is the main result 
of the present work, and most of the rest of the paper is devoted to its proof. The 
logic ET, mentioned below, is defined and shown to be decidable in the next section. 
Theorem 5.5. For any sentence 4 of L, the following are equivalent: 
(i) +EET; 
(ii) #J is an ejfective tautology; 
(iii) any arithmetical instance of C$ is efectively true in the standard model of 
arithmetic. 
6. Logic ET: Syntactic description and decidability 
In this section and throughout the rest of the paper, if not stated otherwise, “param- 
eter” will always mean natural number and “sentence” or “sliteral” (see Terminology 
and Notation 3.1( 11)) will mean sentence or sliteral of L with parameters in NAT, the 
set of natural numbers. 
Terminology and Notation 6.1. (1) When speaking about a subformula (subsentence, 
literal) of a formula, we are often interested in a concrete occurrence of this subformula 
rather than the subformula s such (which may have several occurrences). Classical 
logic does not care very much about distinction between subformulas and their occur- 
rences, but we do. In order to stress that we mean a concrete occurrence, we shall use 
the words osubformula, osubsentence, osliteral (“0” for “occurrence”). For example, 
if c1 is the first osliteral 0 = 0 of the formula 0 = OVO = 0, then the result of substituting 
in the latter a by B is PO 0 = 0; however, if 01 is the sliteral 0 =0, then such a result 
is PO/I. 
(2) A surface osubsentence of a sentence a is an osubsentence y which is not in 
the scope of 7, V, A, 3 or V. In this case we also say that y has a surface occurrence 
in cc. 
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And we say that a sentence y has a weak surface occurrence in a, if y is not in the 
scope of V, A, 3 or V (but it may be in the scope of 1). Since only atoms can be in 
the scope of 1, any nonatomic sentence has a surface occurrence in c1 if and only if 
it has a weak surface occurrence in a. 
(3) A multiplicative atom, or multiplicatively atomic sentence is a sentence which 
is either a sliteral or has one of the forms cr VP, tx A /?, 3xa,Vna. In other words, 
multiplicatively atomic is a sentence which is the only surface osubsentence of itself. 
(4) Every formula is a multiplicative (V,A) combination of its surface osubfor- 
mulas. For example, the formula (ctAg)Va is the combination “(-1 A-z)V-3” of 
01, /? and a, or the combination “(-*A--,)V-3” of /?, CI and a, or the combination 
“--IV-~_” of anp and a, or the combination “-1” of (oAj3)Va. We shall usually 
use capital Latin letters for multiplicative combinations. Say, if A is “(-2A-,)V--3”, 
then A(/?,a,a) means (ctAj?)Va and A(a,P,a) means (/?Aa)Va. By using the sign 
“!” in an expression like A!(ori,.. . , a,), we shall indicate that each ai is a multiplica- 
tive atom. Thus, the sentence A!(q). . . , a,) contains exactly n multiplicatively atomic 
surface osubsentences, whereas A( al,. . . , a,,) may contain more than n multiplicatively 
atomic osubsentences. 
(5) A hypersentence is a sentence 4 together with a (possibly empty) set of disjoint 
pairs (a~, a1 ) of opposite (recall Terminology and Notation 3.1(6)) surface osliterals of 
4; such pairs will be called married couples (of the hypersentence), and a0 and al are 
said to be spouses to each other. As these pairs are disjoint, every osliteral can have 
at most one spouse. If an osliteral has a spouse, it is said to be married, otherwise it 
is single. 
(6) A hypersentence is said to be clean, if there are no married couples in it. 
Every sentence a will, at the same time, be understood as the corresponding clean 
hypersentence denoted by the same letter a, and vice versa: every clean hypersentence 
a will be identified with the sentence a. 
Remark 6.2. In order to relax terminology and notation, it is convenient o assume 
that the set of married couples is somehow graphically “built in” the hyperformula: 
say, spouses are connected with curved lines. Then we can freely use such terms as, 
“the result of replacing in a hypersentence a the osubsentence /3by y”, or “the result of 
replacing in a the parameter a by the parameter b”. True, this “result” may not always 
remain a hypersentence: say, if a married osliteral was replaced by another (different) 
sentence and its spouse was let? unchanged, then the new “spouses” will not be opposite 
any more. However, there are at least two interesting cases when replacement is safe: 
1. When the replaced osubsentence does not contain a married osliteral; 
2. When all occurrences of some parameter a in the hypersentence are replaced by 
another parameter b. Clearly, in this case married couples containing a will remain 
opposite to each other, for a will be changed to b in both of them. 
Definition 6.3. A hyperlabeling for a hypersentence a is a function 1: {surface osub- 
sentences of a} --) (0, 1) such that, calling the value of 1 for a sentence p the hyperlabel 
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of /?, we have: 
1. Spouses have different (opposite) hyperlabels; 
2. Single osliterals have the hyperlabel 0; 
3. z(cNp) = Z(3XGl) = 0; 
4. Z(c@) = Z(KXcl) = 1; 
5. Z(aV/?) = max{Z(a), I(/?)}; 
6. Z(a&3) = min{Z(cc), Z(B)}. 
Definition 6.4. A hypersentence a is said to be l-like, if for any hyperlabeling 1, we 
have Z(a)= 1; otherwise c( is said to be O-like. 
Of course, the question whether a hypersentence is 0- or l-like is decidable. 
Definition 6.5. A hypersentence p will be said to be a marriage-extension of a hyper- 
sentence u., if a and B are identical as sentences and the set of married couples of CI 
is a proper subset of that of B. 
Definition 6.6. Let c( and p be hypersentences. 
(1) We say that /? is a 1-hyperdevelopment of CI iff one of the following holds: 
(a) p is the result of replacing in a some surface osubsentence y A 6 by y or 6, or 
(b) j3 is the result of replacing in CI some surface osubsentence Vxy(x) by y(a) for 
some parameter a. 
To get the definition of strict l-hyperdevelopment, we add to the clause (b) the 
condition that a is the smallest parameter not occuring in ~1. 
(2) We say that p is a 0-hyperdevelopment of a iff one of the following holds: 
(a) /3 is the result of replacing in M: some surface osubsentence y V 6 by y or 6, or 
(b) p is the result of replacing in a some surface osubsentence 3xy(x) by y(a) for 
some parameter a, or 
(c) p is a marriage-extension of CC. To get the definition of strict O-hyperdevelop- 
ment, we add to the clause (b) the condition that either a occurs in CI, or M does not 
contain parameters and a = 0. 
(3) Finally, we say that p is (simply) a hyperdevelopment (resp. strict hyperdevelop- 
ment) of a, if p is a I- or 0-hyperdevelopment (resp. strict l- or 0-hyperdevelopment) 
of B. 
Lemma 6.7. (a) There is no injnite chain ao, ~1,. . . of hypersentences such that for 
any i, LX+~ is a hyperdevelopment of ai; moreover, for any jixed a~, there is a jnite 
upper bound on the lengths of all such chains. 
(b) The set of all strict hyperdevelopments of any hypersentence a is jinite. 
Proof. (a) In fact, the length of each such chain is <m-t(n/2), where m is the number 
of occurrences of V, A, 3,‘d in a0 and n is the number of occurrences of predicate letters 
in CIO except occurrences in married osliterals. It s&ices to observe that each transfer 
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from c(i to a;+1 (where ai+r is a hyperdevelopment of ai) means “spending” in ai either 
one of the occurrences of one of the operators V, A, 3, V (this occurrence disappears in 
ai+i) or a pair of single osliterals (which become married in ai+i). 
(b) Evident. 0 
Definition 6.8. The hypercomplexity of a hypersentence a1 is the length n of the 
longest chain al,. . . , a, of hypersentences such that for each i with 16 i < n, ai+l is a 
hyperdevelopment of ai. 
So, if /I is a hyperdevelopment of a, then the hypercomplexity of /I is less than that 
of a. 
Definition 6.9. We now define the set ET of hypersentences by stipulating that a E ET 
iff one of the following holds: 
1. a is l-like and any 1-hyperdevelopment of it belongs to ET; 
2. a is O-like and there is a 0-hyperdevelopment of it which belongs to ET. 
The above definition is correct, because it defines a E ET in terms of /I E ET for 
those p’s whose hypercomplexity is less than that of a. 
Notation 6.10. a[a/b] denotes the result of replacing in a every occurrence of the 
parameter a by b (see Remark 6.2). 
Lemma 6.11. Suppose b is a parameter not occurring in a hypersentence a, and a is 
any parameter. Then a E ET iY a[a/b] E ET. 
Proof. Indeed, if b does not occur in a, then a and a[a/b] are congruent in the sense 
that the only difference between these two sentences is that the first uses a and the 
second b instead. Therefore, there is no reason why one hypersentence should be in 
ET and the other not. El 
Lemma 6.12. For any sentence a and any parameters a and b, if a E ET, then 
a[a/b] E ET. 
Proof. Assume a E ET. Let a be A!(ys, 71,. . . , y,). Then a[a/b] = A!(~o[a/b], y1 [a/b], . . . , 
Ynkdbl). 
First note that 
a is O-like zr a[a/b] is O-like. (2) 
Indeed, suppose a is O-like, i.e. for some hyperlabeling 1 for a, l(a) = 0. Let 1’ be 
the hyperlabeling for a[a/b] such that for any married osliteral yi[o/b] of a[a/b], 
Z’(ri[o/b]) = l(ri). Clearly, l(a) = l’(a[a/b]) (= 0) and, consequently, a[a/b] is O-like. 
And in a similar way we can show that if a[a/b] is O-like, then so is a. 
To prove the lemma, we proceed by induction on the hypercomplexity of a. 
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Case 1: ct is O-like. Then there is a 0-hyperdevelopment /I EET of a. By the induction 
hypothesis, P[a/b] E ET. Since, by (2), a[a/b] is O-like, it is enough to show that B[a/b] 
is a 0-hyperdevelopment of a[a/b]. 
According to Definition 6.6(2), the fact that b is a 0-hyperdevelopment of a means 
that one of the following three subcases takes place: 
Subcase 1: /.I is the result of replacing in a some yi of the form & V $1 by $j 





As we see, B[a/b] is then a 0-hyperdevelopment of a[a/b]. 
Subcase 2: B is the result of replacing in a some yi of the form 3x$(x) by I&C) 
for some parameter c. We may suppose that i=O. So, we have 
and 
Denote the formula Il/(x)[a/b] by 4(x). Then 
ablbl = AW4(x),ylb/bl,. . .,mWl) 
and, as it is easy to see, 
BWI = A!(+(@, rlblbl,. . . , y&/bl), 
where d = c, if c # a, and d = b, if c = a. In either case, /?[a/b] is a 0-hyperdevelopment 
of a[a/b]. 
Subcase 3: /I is a marriage-extension f a. It is obvious that /?[a/b] is then a marriage- 
extension of a[a/b] and thus, /l[a/b] is a 0-hyperdevelopment of a[a/b]. 
Case 2: a is l-like. Then, by (2) (as being l-like means nothing but not being 
O-like), a[a/b] is l-like. Consider any 1-hyperdevelopment 6 of a[a/b]. We need to 
show that MEET. 
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Subcase 1: 6 is the result of replacing in a[a/b] some yJa/b] of the form $0 A $1 
by @. We may suppose that i, j = 0. It is clear that yo = $6 A Ii/i for some r&, r& such 
that I,& = &[a/b] and +i = ${[a/b]. Let 
Then 6’ is a 1-hyperdevelopment of a. Notice that 6 = #[a/b]. Since UEET, 6’ EET, 
whence, by the induction hypothesis, GEET. 
Subcase 2: 6 is the result of replacing in u[a/b] some yi[a/b] of the form V’xll/(x) 
by e(c) for some parameter c. We may suppose that i = 0. In view of Lemma 6.11 
(as $(x) does not contain a), we may suppose that c#a. Then yo =Vx$‘(x) for some 
II/’ such that t++(x)= &‘[a/b](x). Let 
Notice that 6’ is a 1-hyperdevelopment of c( and 6 = #[a/b]. Since LXEET, 6’ E ET, 
whence, by the induction hypothesis, MEET. 0 
Lemma 6.13 (Another definition of ET). For any hypersentence CC, we have c( E ET 
ifs: 
(a) CI is l-like and any strict 1-hyperdevelopment of it belongs to ET, or 
(b) u is O-like and there is a strict 0-hyperdevelopment of it which belongs to ET. 
Proof. (a) Suppose CI is l-like. If MEET, then any 1-hyperdevelopment of M. is in ET 
and, - as a strict 1-hyperdevelopment is at the same time a 1-hyperdevelopment, - any 
strict 1-hyperdevelopment of LY is in ET. Assume now c1 9 ET. Then there is a l-hyper- 
development y of a with y 6 ET. If y is at the same time a strict hyperdevelopment of 
c1 we are done. Otherwise, y is the result of replacing in CI an osubsentence Vx6(x) by 
6(a), for some parameter a. Let b be the smallest parameter not occurring in a, and 
let y’ be the result of replacing in c( the osubsentence Vx&(x) by 6(b). Note that y’ 
is a strict 1-hyperdevelopment of CC. To show that y’$! ET, notice that y= y’[b/a] (the 
fact that b does not occur in M. and that therefore b occurs only in the osubsentence 
6(b) of the sentence y is essential here), whence, as y @ ET, Lemma 6.12 implies that 
y’$ET. 
(b) Suppose tl is O-like. If 01 # ET, then no 0-hyperdevelopment of LY is in ET and 
therefore there is no strict 0-hyperdevelopment of u in ET. Assume now CCEET. Then 
there is a 0-hyperdevelopment /I of c( with j? E ET. If /I is not at the same time a 
strict 0-hyperdevelopment of a, then /I is the result of replacing in o! an osubsentence 
3x&x) by 6(a) for a not occurring in ~1. Let b be any parameter occurring in CI or 
_ if CI does not contain parameters, let b be 0. As it is easily seen, /?[a/b] is the result 
of replacing in CI the osubsentence 3x6(x) by 6(b), which means - in view of our 
assumptions about b - that /3[a/b] is a 0-hyperdevelopment of a. And, since p E ET, 
Lemma 6.12 implies that P[a/b] E ET. 0 
Theorem 6.14. ET is decidable. In fact, it is decidable in polynomial space. 
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Proof. The decidability of ET immediately follows from Lemmas 6.13 and 6.7, and a 
straightforward analysis of the appropriate definitions and proofs convinces us that a 
reasonable decision algorithm needs at most polynomial space. 17 
Lemma 6.15. (1) if M E ET and j3 is a l-hyperdevelopment of ~1, then BEET; 
(2) if CI 6 ET and j3 is a O-hyperdevelopment of cc, then /I $Z ET. 
Proof. We consider only the first clause, the case when /I is a 1-hyperdevelopment of 
a on the basis of Definition 6.6( la). The other cases (of both clauses) are handled in 
a quite similar way. We use induction on the hypercomplexity of LX. 
Suppose CI =A(& A &,~)EET and /I =A(&,?) (iE{1,2}). 
If a is l-like, then, by Definition 6.9, /?EET. 
Suppose now a is O-like. A little analysis of Definition 6.3 (together with Definition 
6.4) convinces us that then A(&, z) is O-like. According to Definition 6.9(2), there is a 
0-hyperdevelopment of CI which belongs to ET. Observe that this 0-hyperdevelopment 
has the form A(& AC!?,, p) and A(&, p) . IS a 0-hyperdevelopment of A(6i, z). But, by 
the induction hypothesis (as A(& A 82, F) E ET), we have A(6i, F) E ET, which means 
that A(6i, T)E ET. 0 
7. Relaxed linguistic games 
As we require the domain of a model for L to be countable, we shall assume that 
the domain 3~ of any model we consider is NAT. True, a finite model cannot be 
isomorphic to a model with domain NAT. However, any finite model can be viewed 
as a countably infinite model where we have infinitely many “copies” of one of the 
elements of the domain. Therefore, the assumption that the domain of every model is 
NAT in fact does not lead to any loss of generality. 
As we agreed in the previous section, by a “sentence” we always mean a sentence 
with parameters in NAT. 
Throughout this section we assume that a model A for L is fixed. 
I suggest to the reader to recall Definition 3.4 and our terminological convention 
according to which we can identify a sentence a with the game NA(~). 
Definition 7.1. We define NG to be the net (WA, IA, R$) of games, where WA and 1~ 
are defined as in Definition 3.4 and for any a,/?~ W, we have orR%/I iff /? is the result 
of replacing in LX a surface multiplicatively atomic osubsentence 6, which has the same 
label as a, by a sentence 6’ such that 6R_,&‘. 
Terminology and Notation 7.2. In order to distinguish the two versions Nd and N$ 
of the net of games induced by J?‘, from now on we call the former the regular 
version and the latter the relaxed version. We also apply the adjectives “regular” and 
“relaxed”, respectively, to the development relations .4& and 92, the games NA(u) 
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and N>(a) or solutions to them, etc. However, we may omit these adjectives in cases 
when it does not matter which version we deal with, when the version can be seen 
from the context, or when we consider a variable version. 
Of course every regular development of o! is, at the same time, a relaxed develop- 
ment, but vice versa does not generally hold. For example, 
30 = X)n(P(aWY+(Y)) 
is a relaxed, but not regular, development of 
(3) 
3x(x = x)a(3YNY)o~Y+(Y))? 
whatever the model is. 
(4) 
Intuitively, the difference between the regular and the relaxed versions of linguistic 
games is that in relaxed games players may make “ahead-of-time”, or “impatient” 
moves. The main task of this section is to establish that such impatient moves of one 
player cannot affect the chance of the other player to win. Moreover, the other player 
may even benefit by the impatience of his adversary. Going back to the above example, 
in the position (4) it was Proponent’s move because of the O-labeled multiplicative 
conjunct 3x(x =x); the other conjunct was l-labeled and he did not have (and was 
not allowed in the regular case) to move in it. However, by going to the position 
(3) Proponent has made an impatient move in the second conjunct of (4). This did 
not release him from the duty to move in the first conjunct (one can show that a 
properly impatient move never changes the label), so he still has to replace in (3) the 
osubsentence 3x(x =x) by (b = b) for some 6, which shows that Proponent did not 
benefit by postponing this regular move; on the other hand, he missed the possibility to 
use, in the second conjunct of (4), the strategy described in Introduction that enabled a 
bad chess player to defeat the world champion in the game CVX. It would be more 
clever of Proponent to go from the position (4) to 
then wait until Opponent makes his move in VY+(y), and only after that make a 
move in 3yfi(y), choosing the same substitution for y as Opponent will have chosen. 
Definition 7.3. Let e E (0, 1 }. An e-truce from a sentence u to a sentence /? is a legal 
h$-sequence y 1, . . . , yn with nZ1 such that yt =a, ~,,=/3 and for every ldi tn (if 
n > l), l(yi) = e; such a trace is said to be trivial, if II = 1; otherwise the trace is 
nontrivial. 
An e-tracing for a sentence /3 is a function t defined on some (sub)set {pi,. . . , b,,} 
of surface osubsentences of fi which assigns to each pi an e-trace (from some sentence) 
to ai. And an e-traced sentence (j?, t) is a sentence a given together with an e-tracing 
t for it. 
A trace will usually serve as a piece of information on the history of a play used 
by Proponent for making a successful next move. 
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Although Lemma 7.7 below is in good accordance with intuition, a rigorous proof 
of it takes quite a space, and an “impatient” reader prone to trust us can just memorize 
Lemma 7.7 and skip the rest of this section. 
Definition 7.4. Let e = 0 or e = 1 and CI = A!(cri,. . . ,u,). Then an e-expansion of a 
is a traced sentence (p, t), where p has the form A(Bt,. . . , fin) and t is an e-tracing for 
p which assigns, to each pi with 1 <i <n, a (possibly trivial) e-trace from ai to pi. 
Such an expansion is said to be pulling, if 
l the label of a is e and 
l there is 1 Q i <n such that the trace tpi from xi to pi is nontrivial and, for the second 
term CJ of this trace, the sentence 
is a regular development of a. 
Then the osubsentence pi is said to be a pulling osubsentence of this expansion. 
Intuitively, an e-expansion of c1 is a pair (/?,t), where p is the result of a series of 
“superimpatient” e-Player’s moves made in some surface components of a, and t is a 
record of the history of these moves (“superimpatient”, because this player does not 
even care whether it is his move in the whole position or not). A pulling expansion 
contains a hint for a “patient” e-Player how to make a move in u which would be really 
legal in a regular play and which would take us closer to B (/3 “pulls” u towards itself). 
Namely, this move should be a repetition of the first move made by the superimpatient 
e-Player in a pulling component. 
Although an expansion of a is a traced sentence, i.e. a sentence /I together with a 
tracing, in some contexts we identify it with just /3. 
Lemma 7.5. Suppose (/?, t) is an e-expansion of M and fl is e-labeled. Then c1 is 
e-labeled, too. 
Proof. Let a, /I and t be as in the definition of e-expansion. Notice that then for each 
1 <i <n, if pi is e-labeled, then so is tLi. Then it follows easily by Definition 3.4 that 
if /I is e-labeled, then so is a. 0 
Lemma 7.6. Suppose a and /I have the labels e and 1 - e, respectively, and (p, t) is 
an e-expansion of a. Then (p, t) is a pulling e-expansion of M. 
Proof. We consider the case e = 0; the case e = 1 is symmetric. So, assume the 
conditions of the lemma with e = 0. Let a = A!(al,. . . ,a,) and /I = A#,, . . . ,/I”). We 
proceed by induction on the complexity of A, that is, the “multiplicative complexity” 
of a. First of all note that as each ai is multiplicatively atomic, any relaxed development 
of Ui is, at the same time, a regular development of ai. In view of this, the case when 
the sentence c1 is multiplicatively atomic, is straightforward. 
G. Japaridzel Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 85 (1997) 87-156 119 
Suppose a=&V&. We may suppose that &=Ar!(ar,. . .,a,,,) and c#Q=Az!(~~+~,.. . , 
a,) for some l<m < n. Then fl = $rv&, where 11/1 = A~(/?l,...,j?~) and $2 = 
A2G.L+1,. . . , j$). Let tr and t2 be the restrictions oft to {/?I,. . . , pm) and {&+I , . . . , /&}, 
respectively. Notice that ($r,tt) and ($2, t2) are O-expansions of C#Q and ~$2, respec- 
tively. As a is O-labeled, both its multiplicative disjuncts are O-labeled. And as /? is 
1 -labeled, we may suppose that $1 is l-labeled. Thus, $1 is l-labeled and ($1, tl ) is 
a O-expansion of the O-labeled ~$1. Then, by the induction hypothesis, this expansion 
is pulling, i.e. there is 1 <i<m such that the trace tl/?i (which= tfii) from ai to pi is 
not trivial and for the second term CT of this trace, the sentence 
AlCal,..., ai-i,~,ai+l,...,%) 
is a regular development of 4; but then, by Definition 3.4, the sentence 
Al(al,. . . , ai--l,o,ai+l,...,a,)~~2, 
i.e. the sentence 
ACal,..., ai-l,~,ai+l,...,%), 
is a regular development of a. This means that (8, t) is a pulling O-expansion of a. 
The case a = #I a 42 can be handled in a similar manner. 17 
Lemma 7.7. For any sentence 4 of L, 
(a) N&(4) is solvable ijf N;(4) is; 
(b) NA(c#I) is efictiveiy solvable isfNG(+) is. 
Proof. We prove only the clause (b); the clause (a) is easier to prove. 
(+=) Assume h is an effective solution to N;(4). By induction on the length of a 
&play we simultaneously define Proponent’s effective history-sensitive strategy f and 
another effective function g which assigns to every initial segment t = 51,. . . , &, of an 
NM(4)-play with this strategy of Proponent’s a traced sentence g?; and we verify, at 
each step, that the following conditions are satisfied. 
Condition 1. gj! is a O-expansion of 5,. 
Condition 2. h is a relaxed solution to gt (see the paragraph preceding Lemma 7.5). 
Here we go. We define g(4) to be 4, where every multiplicatively atomic osubsen- 
tence has a trivial trace. Of course, both conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied (for (#) in 
the role of (l)). 
Now, suppose t = 51,. . . , ($ is an initial segment of a &play with Proponent’s strat- 
egy f, gt is defined and the conditions l-2 are satisfied. Let 5, = A!(al,. . . , ak) and 
s? be A(P1 , . . . , /?k) with relaxed O-traces trl,. . . , trk from the osubsentences al,. . . , ak 
to PI,..., bk, respectively. 
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Case 1: &, is l-labeled. Then f does not have to be defined for z and we only 
need to define g for (f, &+i ), where &+I is an arbitrary regular development of 5,. 
A regular development is always, at the same time, a relaxed development, so we have 
5 n+l =A(4 ,...,ai-l,a,ai+l,...,ak) 
for some i, where r~ is a development of the l-labeled ai. That is, <,+I has the form 
where gi,..., o,,, are all surface multiplicatively atomic osubsentences of (r. Then we 
define 
g(&+1) =Wl,...,Pi-1,Cl ,...,~rn,Bi+l,...,Pk). 
We want to make this sentence a traced one which would be a O-expansion of &+i. 
It is easily seen that this goal is achieved if we let each pj have the same O-trace as 
it had in gt, and every aj have a trivial trace. So, condition 1 is satisfied. 
As there was a O-trace from the l-labeled ai to pi, this trace could only be a trivial 
one, i.e. ai = pi. As & is l-labeled, so is (by Lemma 7.5 and the condition 1) gt, 
which easily implies that g(z,ln+i) . IS a relaxed development of gp and, as h is a 
relaxed solution to the latter, h must be a relaxed solution to g(z, &+I) as well (see 
Fact 2.9). Thus, the condition 2, too, is satisfied. 
Case 2: 5, is O-labeled. Then we need to define f for f and g for (z, f T). We use 
the notation P(q), defined by ho(q) = q and h”+‘(q) = h(h’(n)). Let p be the least 
number such that hP(gz) is (defined and) l-labeled. Such a p exists, for, if the label 
of gz, is 1, then p = 0 will do, and if this label is 0, then the existence of p follows 
from the fact that h is a relaxed solution to gt. By the same reason, 
h is a relaxed solution to P(gf). 
We have 
(5) 
. . . 
hP(gf) = A@[, . . . ) 6;). 
For each 1 <i < k, let tq be the result of concatenating t% (see the paragraph pre- 
ceding Case 1) with (S!, . . ,6,!) and then repeatedly deleting each term Si/ equal to its 
left neighbor in the sequence. 
Now, let o be the traced sentence A(#‘, . . . , S,“), with the trace t? for each osub- 
sentence 8:. It is evident that o, just like gt, is a O-expansion of 5,. And as cc) is 
l-labeled, Lemma 7.6 gives that it is a pulling O-expansion of 4,. Let then a,? be the 
leftmost pulling osubsentence of this expansion, and let o be the second term of the 
trace t$. Then we define 
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Note that 
0 is a O-expansion off z, (6) 
As the second term rr of a O-trace from tlj is a relaxed development of Uj and as the 
latter is multiplicatively atomic, cr a regular development of it as well. This means that 
f 5 is a regular development of 5,. 
And we define g( f, f l) to be the traced sentence w. According to (5) and (6), the 
conditions 1 and 2 are then satisfied for (2, f t). 
Thus, f, which evidently is effective, is defined for any initial segment ? of a NM(~)- 
play with Proponent’s strategy f, as soon as the last sentence 5, of t is O-labeled, and 
the value of f is then a regular development of tn. This means nothing but that f is 
an effective solution to NJ(@). 
(=+) Assume h is an effective solution to N&(4). By induction on the length of a 
relaxed &play we simultaneously define Proponent’s effective history-sensitive relaxed 
strategy f together with two other effective functions t and g, where g assigns to 
every initial segment t = t 1,. . . ,&, of an N;(4)-play with this strategy of Proponent’s 
a sentence gt, and t, applied to z, returns a tracing for r, (makes the sentence & 
traced), so that the following conditions are satisfied: 
Condition 1. (t,, tt) is a l-expansion of gt. 
Condition 2. h is a regular solution to g?. 
Here we go. We define g(4) to be 4 and t(4) to be the tracing which assigns the 
trivial trace to every surface osubsentence of 4. Evidently, both conditions 1 and 2 are 
satisfied (for (4) in the role of (t) ). 
Now, suppose r’ = 41 , . . . , r, is an initial segment of a relaxed &play with Pro- 
ponent’s strategy f, g and t are defined for 5 and the conditions l-2 are satisfied. 
Let gt be A!@ I,...,/&), 5, be A(al,...,ak) and t< , . . . , t$ be the l-traces assigned to 
~1,. . . , uk by the tracing tf. 
Case 1: 5, is l-labeled. Then f does not have to be defined for 1 and we only need 
to define g and t for (z, &+r), where 5 n+r is an arbitrary relaxed development of t,. 
The value of g we leave unchanged: g(f, tn+r) = gz. 
We have 
5 nfl =A(crl,...,ai-l,~,ai+l,...,C(k), 
for some i, where G is a relaxed development of the l-labeled tli. Then we define 
t( t, &+I) as the tracing that leaves unchanged the trace t$ for each Ej with j # i, and 
assigns the trace (& 0) to (r. Conditions 1 and 2 evidently remain satisfied. 
Case 2: {, is O-labeled. Then we need to define f for t and g and t for (f, f <). 
First we define the sequence 00,. . . , op of sentences and the sequence ro,. . . ,rP of 
tracings for 5, as follows: 
l 00 = gr and vo = t(!. Note that, by the condition 1, (&,ro) is a l-expansion of 00. 
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l Suppose now w,,, and r,,, are defined, o, has the form B!(ql,. . . , qr) and (5,, r,,,), 
where 5, has the form B([l, . . . , cl), is a l-expansion of 0,. Then: 
1. If o, has the label 0, then p = m. 
2. Suppose now w, has the label 1. Then, by Lemma 7.6, (&ml) is a pulling l- 
expansion of t0,, and let [j be the leftmost pulling osubsentence of this expansion. 
Let 
CJ = C!(O,,...,Q) 
be the second term of the trace assigned by r, to [j. Then we define o,,,+i to be 
B(rli ,...,vli-l,o,~j+l,...,rr), 
whose !-form is 
for a corresponding D. 
The trace assigned by r,,, to cj looks like 
(yli, C($t.. . P gj”>~. . . f c(@f~. . . > (r,“>>2 
where C(r$ ,..., (Tdo) = cr = C(ai ,..., Q) and C($ ,..., oj) = cj. SO, 5, is 
Wi ,...,~j-l,$ , . . .7 $3 LIj+l 9 f. .Y cl). Now, we define r,,,+l as follows: to each 
ii with 1 <i < I, i # j, r,,,+l assigns the same trace as assigned by r,,,, and to each 
g’i (1 <i Ed), r,+l assigns the trace which is the result of repeatedly deleting 
terms equal to their left neighbors in the sequence (a&. . . , 0;). 
It is not hard to verify that (5,, r,+l ) is a l-expansion of u,+i 
Notice that each o,+i is a regular development of o,,, (recall what pulling expansion 
means), and the number p, sooner or later, will be reached. wP is a regular rt-l- 
development (recall Terminology 2.2(2)) of ws = sf and, as h is a regular solution to 
the latter (the condition 2), by Fact 2.9, we have 
h is a regular solution to op. 
And, as we noted above, 
(7) 
(c&r,) is a l-expansion of op. (8) 
o.+, is O-labeled and, as h is a regular solution to it, h must be defined for o+, and 
its value must be a regular development of o+,. That is, we have 
wP = G!(&,...,&) 
for some G and 1, 
r, = G(M,...,P,) 
for some ji and (as every development is a relaxed development) 
hop = G(~l,...,;li_l,o,li+el,...,~=c) 
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for some CJ. We then define 
ft = G(C11,...,~i-l,a,~i+l,...,CLc). 
Taking into account that 1i is O-labeled, which means that the l-trace from li to pi 
determined by rp is a trivial one, i.e. li = pi, it is clear that 
j-f (is defined and) is a relaxed development of 5,. (9) 
We define 
And we define t(f, f T) to be the tracing for f T that assigns to each pj (1 <j 6 c, 
j # i) the same l-trace to pj as q,, and assigns the trivial trace to (T. Then (8) implies 
that the condition 1 is satisfied for (2, f z), and that the condition 2 is satisfied follows 
from (7) by Fact 2.9. 
Thus, f, which evidently is effective, is defined for any initial segment t of a Ni( $)- 
play with Proponent’s strategy f, as soon as the last sentence 5, of f is O-labeled, 
and the value of f is then a relaxed development of tn. This means nothing but that 
f is an effective history-sensitive solution to NG(ll/). Therefore, by Theorem 2.14(2), 
Ni($) is effectively solvable. Lemma 7.7 is proved. 0 
8. Proof of Theorem 5.5(i)+-(ii) 
The definition of ET very much resembles our definition of (relaxed) games. 
1-hyperdevelopments correspond to Opponent’s moves and 0-hyperdevelopments cor- 
respond to Proponent’s moves. An essential difference arises only when it comes to 
atoms of the initial sentence: in real games a play may continue beyond these atoms, 
which is not the case with “ET-games”; on the other hand, there is nothing in real 
games directly corresponding to marriage-extension “moves” in ET. 
In this section we are going to show that if a sentence 0: is in ET, then, in every 
model, Proponent has an effective winning strategy for a. Roughly, Proponent acts as 
follows: 
Whenever Opponent makes a move in CC, Proponent finds the corresponding 
I-hyperdevelopment a’ of a and treats it as a “counterpart” of current position. To 
determine how to move now, Proponent finds a 0-hyperdevelopment a” E ET of a’ 
and tries to “copy” in the real play the “ET-move” corresponding to the transfer from 
a’ to a”, and so on. Of course this is not always possible. Namely, if the above “ET- 
move” consists in going from a hypersentence to its marriage-extension, it cannot be 
“copied”. However, marriage between osliterals y and 6 is a signal for Proponent to 
try, from now on, to keep the counterparts (in the real play) of y and 6 opposite to 
each other. So, if Opponent moves in the counterpart of y, Proponent tries to make a 
dual move in 6, and vice versa. As long as Proponent succeeds in doing so, the label 
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of a given position of the real game is 1 whenever its counterpart is l-like, and this 
is what ensures winning. 
The precise definition of this strategy and the proof of its correctness below are 
technically involved and pretty boring, so the reader not willing to fight through them 
can pass on to the next section. 
To sentences, hypersentences and many other objects we deal with, can be assigned 
Giidel numbers. Then, when we say, e.g., “the smallest hypersentence such that.. .‘I, 
we mean “smallest by its Godel number”. 
Terminology and Notation 8.1. We define an operation X on hypersentences: 
X(/I) = /I’, where /3’ is the smallest marriage-extension f p such that /3’ E ET, 
if such a /?’ does not exist, then X(/3) = /?. 
Next, we define X’(B) = fl and Xm+‘(B) = X(Xm(/?)). Clearly for any hypersentence 
fi there is m such that Xm(/?) = Xm+‘(/3) = Xmf2(p) = . . . We then call Xm(/?) the 
X-closure of p. And we say that a sentence is X-closed, if it is its own X-closure. 
Note that 
If /I belongs to ET, then so does its X-closure. (10) 
Now the proof begins. Assume .M is a model for L and $J is sentence of L such that 
4 E ET. We will identify each sentence B of L with the corresponding relaxed game 
N,“(p) (see Defintion 7.1). As we are going to deal only with this relaxed game, the 
word “relaxed” will be omitted before “game”, “trace”, “development”, “strategy”, etc. 
By induction on the length of a &play we simultaneously define Proponent’s ef- 
fective history-sensitive strategy f together with two other effective functions t and g, 
where g assigns to every initial segment f = 51 , . . . , 5, of a @-play with this strategy 
of Proponent’s a hypersentence gf, and t assigns to t a l-tracing (see Definition 7.3) 
for [,, so that the following conditions are satisfied: 
Condition 1. ~J?E ET. 
Condition 2. & is X-closed. 
Condition 3. If 5, = A!(cri,. . . , Q), then gz = A!(/Ii, . . , /?k), where: 
1. If pi is not an osliteral, then cli = pi. 
2. If fii is a O-labeled single osliteral, then, again, ai = /3i. 
3. If pi is a l-labeled single osliteral, then t? assigns to CQ a l-trace from Bi to Dli. 
4. If fij,, and pi, are spouses to each other, then tff assigns to (at least) one of the 
sentences oLjr, i E (0, 1) a l-trace from Yxl-j, to aj,. 
Before we start defining these three functions, let us prove the following fact: 
If condition 3 holds for a hypersentence p in the role of gf 
and p’ is an X-closure of #?, then that condition holds for fi’, too. (11) 
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To see this, it is enough to consider the case when /I’ is a marriage-extension of /I 
which contains just one additional married couple. That is, the only difference between 
/3 and p’ then is that for some 1 d I, m d k, PI and /I,,, were single osliterals in /I and 
they are spouses to each other in /I’. Therefore, conditions 3.1-3.3 trivially continue 
to be satisfied for /I’. So does condition 3.4 for any married couple different from 
(/?I,/?~). So, we only need to verify that condition 3.4 holds for the couple (Pl,flm). 
As /II and /I,,, are opposite to each other, one of them - let it be /II - must have the 
Z.M-label 0, and then, by condition 3.2 for /I, al = fi,. According to condition 3.3 for 
/I, tz assigns to ix, a l-trace from pm; thus, by the chain /I,,, = 181 = lcq, tz assigns 
to a, a l-trace from ~1, which means that condition 3.4 is satisfied. (11) is proved. 
We define g(4) to be the X-closure of 4. And t(4) is the tracing that assigns the 
trivial trace to each l-labeled surface osliteral of 4. It is easy to see that conditions 
l-3 are satisfied (for (4) in the role of (t)). Now, suppose (t) = (tt,.. . , [,) is an 
initial segment of a &play with Proponent’s strategy f, the functions g and t are 
defined for 5 and conditions l-3 are satisfied. According to condition 3, we have 
5, =!!!(a,,..., CQ) and gf=A!(/3t,...,/?k). 
Case 1: &, is l-labeled. Then f does not need to be defined for E we must only 
define g and t for (f, &,+t), where &+i is an arbitrary development of 5,. We have 
5 n+l =A(al,...,Gli-l,(T,ai+l,...,crk) 
for some 1 d i < k, where 0 is a development of the l-labeled Hi. Then one of the 
following three cases takes place: 
Subcase la: Cli is a sliteral. Then, by condition 3.1, pi is a sliteral, too. We define 
g(f, &+I) = gt, which guarantees that conditions 1 and 2 remain to be satisfied. Now 
we need to define t for (t, &+,) an verify that condition 3, too, is satisfied. d 
Subsubcase la(i): pi is single. Then, by condition 3.3, tz assigns to Cli a l-trace r? 
from /!?i to Cli. Then we define t(t, &+I) to be the tracing that assigns the trace (6, a) 
to o; to any other osliteral of tn+i this tracing assigns the same trace as tz. It is easy 
to see that then condition 3 is satisfied. 
Subsubcase la(ii): fli is married to some /Ii. If Cli and aj are opposite, we define 
t(f, tn+l) to be the tracing that assigns the trace (ai, CJ) to o, is undefined for OIj and 
assigns to any other osliteral of 5 ,,+I the same trace as t(. Suppose now ai and aj are 
not opposite. Note that TGli is O-labeled and therefore there cannot exist a (nontrivial) 
trace from lai to Uj. Therefore, by condition 3.4, tt assigns to ai a l-trace from 'OLj 
to ai. Then we define t(f, &+I) to be the tracing that assigns the trace (z?, 0) to g and 
assigns the same trace as tf to any other osliteral of &+t (namely, is undefined for 
aj). It is easily seen that in this subsubcase, too, condition 3 is satisfied. 
Subcase 1 b: Cli = y A 6. Note that then, by condition 3.1, fli = Ui. We may suppose 
that (T = y. Then we define g(t, &+I) to be the X-closure of A(Pt,. . . , Pi_l,a, pi+,, . . . , 
Pk). And t(z, tn+l) is the tracing that assigns to any surface osliteral Uj (1 Gjdk, 
j # i) of &,+i the same trace as t(, and assigns a trivial trace to any other surface 
osliteral of &,+i (i.e. to those that are surface osliterals of o). Condition 1 follows now 
from ( 10) and Lemma 6.15(a), and condition 2 is trivially satisfied; as for condition 
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3, it is evident for Qi,. . .,/$-I, Q, jli+l,. . . , fik) in the role of gt, whence, by (1 1 ), it 
holds for its X-closure g(?, &+I). 
Subcase lc: ai = V~‘xy(x). This subcase is similar to the previous one. 
Case 2: 5, is O-labeled. 
Subcase 2a: gt is O-like. Then, as ~ZE ET, there is a strict 0-hyperdevelopment 
v E ET of gt (if there are many such hyperdevelopments, we suppose that q is the 
smallest among them). Since gf is X-closed, the relation between gz and rl is de- 
termined by Definition 6.6(2a) or 6.6(2b). We consider only the case 6.6(2a); the 
case 6.6(2b) is similar. So, for some i, /Ii = y V 6 and - we may suppose - 
Then we define 
f< = ha1 ,...,~i-l,Y,cli+l,...,~&), 
We define g( z, ft) to be the X-closure of q. And, t( T, ff) is the tracing that assigns 
to any surface osliteral mj (1 <:j <k, j # i) of f z the same trace as tt, and to any 
other surface osliteral of f f (i.e. those that are surface osliterals of y) assigns a trivial 
trace. As q E ET and s(?, f t) is an X-closure of II, condition 1 is satisfied (see (10)). 
Condition 2 holds trivially, and condition 3 is evident in view of (11). 
Subcase 2b: gt is l-like. 
Subsubcase 2b(i): Suppose there is a married couple (/?~,j?~) in gt such that t? 
assigns to a/ a nontrivial l-trace 01,. . . , co, with p 22, 01 = YY~, oP = UI. If there 
are many such couples, we suppose that (/I[,&) is the smallest among them. Then we 
define 
f< =A(al,...,a,-l,l02,a,+l,...,Clk). 
Note that ~1, is O-labeled and 702 is its development, so f t is a development of <,. 
We define g(t, f t) = g<. As for the tracing t(t, &+i), it assigns the trace 02,. . . ,op 
to ~11 and remains the same as tf for any other osubsentence of f z. Conditions 1 and 
2 trivially continue to hold for (t, f t), and condition 3 is also easy to verify. 
Subsubcase 2b(ii): If the married couple described in the subsubcase 2b(i) does not 
exist, then f is undefined for 2 and g, t are undefined for (t, <,+I). 
Thus, in every (sub)subcase of the case when t,, is O-labeled, except 2b(ii), f T is 
defined and its value is a development of t,. To conclude that f is a solution to 4, it 
remains to show that the subsubcase 2b(ii) never takes place. 
But indeed: suppose that the married couple described in 2b(i) does not exist. Con- 
sider an arbitrary married couple (/?I, /$,,) of gt. According to condition 3.4, one of the 
osubsentences CQ, a, of t” - let it be al - comes with a l-trace from lcr, to ul. Con- 
sequently, this trace must be a trivial one, which means that CL/ = x,,,. Thus, for each 
married couple (#II,&,,) of gz, ul and CI, are opposite. Let then h be a hyperlabeling 
such that for any married osliteral pe of gt, h(/&) equals the label of u,. Then for 
every 1 <e<k, h(Pe) < the label of a,, whence h(gf) d the label of&, which means 
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that either 5, is not O-labeled, or &! is not l-like, and this contradicts the conditions 
of the subcase 2b. 
The part (i)+(ii) of Theorem 5.5 is proved. 0 
An analysis of the proof of 5.5(i)+(ii) (and the proofs of all the lemmas employed 
in that proof) can convince us that in fact the following strong version of the soundness 
of ET holds. 
Theorem 8.2. There is an efictive function which, for any model Jr? for L (where 
9~,e,,& are given as Turing machines), returns an effective function (Turing 
machine) f which is a solution to any game NM(+) with C$ E ET. 
I would not like to waste the reader’s time on any more details or comments on the 
proof of this theorem. 
9. Proof of Theorem 5.5(ii)+(iii) 
The part (ii)+(iii) of Theorem 5.5 immediately follows from the clause (b) of 
Lemma 9.2. Before we start proving the latter, we need the following auxiliary lemma. 
Lemma 9.1. Suppose b(x) is a formula of L, $ is an arithmetical translation good 
(see Definition 5.2) for p(x), and (&x))$ = y(x). Then (/?(a))$ = y(a) for any 
parameter a. 
Proof. Assume $ is good for p(x) and (j?(x))s = y(x). According to Remark 5.3, x is 
free in j?(x) iff it is free in y(x). If x is not free in these formulas, then p(x) = b(a), 
y(x) = y(a) and we are done. So, suppose x is free in j?(x), y(x). 
We proceed by induction on the complexity of j?(x). 
Suppose B(x) is an atom P(x, ~1,. . . , yn), all the variables of which are explicitly 
indicated, and $P = 6(x0, . . .,x,). Then, by the definition of translation, (/3(x))s = 
& Yl, . . ., Y,) and (B(a))$=&a,yl,... , yn). Since x is free in y(x) =6(x, ~1,. . . , yn), 
we have y(a)=&a, yl,. . .,y,). Thus, (&a))$=y(a). 
The cases when /I(x) is a complex formula are pretty straightforward, and we con- 
sider only one of them. Suppose b(x) = Vz’zG(x,z). Then y(x) =VZ~(X,Z), where 6/(x, z) = 
(&x,z))s, whence, by the induction hypothesis, 6’(a,z)=(o(a,z))s, whence Vz#(a,z)= 
Vz((G(a,z))s)=(Vz’zG(a,z))s=(~(a))s. But VzcY(a,z)=y(a). Thus, (/?(a))$=y(a). q 
Lemma 9.2. For any sentence 4 of L and any arithmetical translation z good for I$, 
there is a model .M with 9_,r = NAT for L such that: 
(a) ifN~(d) is solvable, then so is Ny(4’); 
(b) if NA(c#J) is effectively solvable, then so is NY(~‘). 
(Recall that 9 is the standard model of arithmetic.) 
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Proof. Taking Lemma 7.7 into account, we will deal only with relaxed plays, and omit 
everywhere the word “relaxed”, as well as the superscript “0”. 
Let us fix a recursive list 
of all arithmetical sentences and a recursive list 
Qo,Ql,... 
of zero place predicate letters of L not occurring in $. Then, for any arithmetical 
sentence /3 = cli, let Qs denote the sliteral Qi. 
Let r be an arithmetical translation good for 4. We may suppose that each predicate 
letter of L either occurs in 4, or is one of the Qi. We define a new arithmetical 
translation $ as follows: 
l For each predicate letter Qi from the above list, $Qi = ai; 
l for any other predicate letter P, $P = zP. 
Thus, every arithmetical sentence B is ys for some (at least one) sentence y of L. 
Note that the translation $ is good for I$. 
We now define a model J# for L: for any atomic sentences y, 6 of L, 
l e”&(r) = l!&$); 
l yR_& iff 6 = Qi for some i and ys&@. 
A straightforward induction on the complexity of y convinces us that 
I.&) = Ms) (all Y). (12) 
Assume h is a solution to NJ(~). We define a Proponent’s history-sensitive strategy 
f and a function g which assigns to every initial segment t = ([I,. . . , t,) of an Ny(#‘)- 
play with this strategy a sentence gf of L such that the following three conditions are 
satisfied: 
Condition 1. h is a solution to NA(gf). 
Condition 2. 5, = (gf)“. 
Condition 3. $ is good for every surface osubsentence of gf. 
We define g(4’) = 4. Thus, condition 1 is satisfied. As q5 does not contain any of 
the atoms Qs, Qi, . . . , evidently 4’ = +s, so condition 2, too, is satisfied. And as $ 
is good for 4, it is good for each subsentence of it, which means that condition 3 is 
satisfied as well. 
Suppose now Z = (51,. . . , (,) is an initial segment of an Ny(4T)-play, gt is defined 
and conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied. In view of condition 2, we must have 
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and 
Case 1: &, is l-labeled (in the standard model of arithmetic). Note that, by (12) and 
condition 2, lo = 1. This position obliges Opponent to move, and we only need to 
define g for (f, &+I), where &+i is an arbitrary development of l,. &$+i must be the 
result of replacing in 5, a l-labeled osubsentence /I” by an (arithmetical) development 
fs of it. 
Subcase la: pi = y A 6. Then /If = ys A 6s. And we may suppose that G = ys. 
Then we define g(t, tn+i) to be the result of replacing in gz the osubsentence ji by 
y. Of course, &+i = (g(z,&,+t))s. Note also that g(t,&+i) is a development of the 
l-labeled gf and, as h is a solution to the latter, it must be a solution to g(z, &+I), too. 
Thus, conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied. Since $ was good for B; and y is a subsentence 
of pi, $ remains good for y. As no other osubsentences of gf have been changed, 
condition 3, too, continues to hold. 
Subcase lb: pi = Vxy(x). Let 6(x) = (y(x))s. Then /I” = ‘Vx’xs(x) and cr = 6(a) for 
some parameter a. Since $ is good for y(x), by Lemma 9.1, 6(a), i.e. D, is then equal 
to (~(a))$. We define g(?, &+I) to be the result of replacing in gt the osubsentence pi 
by ~(a). Clearly, (g(t, &+i))s = &+I, i.e. condition 2 holds. And an argument similar 
to that from the previous subcase can convince us that conditions 1 and 3 hold as well. 
Subcase lc: fii is a sliteral. Then we define g(?, t,+r) to be the result of replacing 
in g? the osubsentence /Ii by Q,,. Evidently, &+I = (g(& &+I))$; also, g(&&,+t) is 
a development of the l-labeled gl and, as h is a solution to the latter, it must be a 
solution to g(T, tn+i), too. Again, both conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied. Also, since Q0 
does not contain any variables, $ is good for it and this implies that condition 3, too, 
is satisfied. 
Case 2: 5, is O-labeled. Then, by (12), so is gs and, as h is a solution to the latter, 
h(gf) is a development of gt and 
h is a solution to h(gf), (13) 
h(gz) must be the result of replacing in gt a O-labeled osubsentence pi by a develop- 
ment CJ of pi. Then we define f z to be the result of replacing in 5, the corresponding 
osubsentence /I” by os. Of course, 
(14) 
Note that, by (12), j?f is O-labeled. It is also easy to verify that crs is a development 
of j?i$ (if pi has the form 3 . . ., we will need to use Lemma 9.1). Therefore, 
f f is a development of 5,. (15) 
We define g(t, f f) = h(gt). According to (13) and (14), conditions 1 and 2 are then 
satisfied for (<, f f) in the role of t. If pi is not a sliteral, then o is a subsentence of 
pi and therefore $ remains good for it. And if pi is a sliteral, then so is CJ and, as g 
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then does not contain variables, $ is good for it. This implies that condition 3 holds 
as well. 
Thus, as soon as &, is O-labeled, f is defined for z and its value is a development 
of & (by (15)). We conclude that f is a solution to 6. The clause (a) of the lemma 
is proved. 
Finally, notice that f is primitive recursive relative to h, whence, if h is effective, 
so is f. This proves the clause (b). 0 
10. Generalized modus ponens for effective truth 
Lemma 10.1. Suppose A(a,$) and TCI are efictively true in a model ~2. Then, for 
any sentence y, A(y,p) is effectively true in A’. ’ 
Proof. Fix a model A. We shall deal only with the relaxed net of games induced by 
~2, and omit the word “relaxed” everywhere. 
Assume that h is an effective solution to A(a, j) and r is an effective solution to ~a. 
The intuition behind Proponent’s strategy for A(y, $) we are going to define can be 
described as follows: Proponent plays only in the component p of A(y, 8). To determine 
what moves to make in this play, Proponent also plays an “experimental” A(a, fi)-play, 
where he uses the strategy h. He has an assistant who is in the role of opponent in this 
play. The assistant uses the strategy r for the component a and repeats Opponent’s 
moves, made in the component $ of the A(y, p)-play, in the component B of the 
experimental play. Then, the strategy h’s replies to these moves in the experimental 
play show Proponent how to act in the component p of the A(y, j)-play. The strategy r 
allows the assistant to always make the component a O-labeled, and this means that the 
strategy h solves A(a, p) only at the expense of a successful play in the component $. 
And as moves in this component are copied in the A(y, fi)-play, Proponent is guaranteed 
to win in the latter. 
The reader satisfied by this explanation can skip the rest of this section which is 
devoted to a formal implementation of this intuition. 
Let 
8 = p*,...,lL. 
Before we describe a solution to A(y, p), we need some local terminology and notation. 
For a function s and argument B, so(B) = B and ?+‘(B) = s(sk(B)). 
A sentence i will be said to be interesting, if I = A(&, 61,. . . , S,) for some 
60,. . . ,a,,, such that h is a solution to 1 and r is a solution to +50; the osubsen- 
tence 60 will be said to be the main osubsentence of 1. Thus, A(a, fl) is an interesting 
sentence and a is its main osubsentence. 
’ To see why this lemma should be considered as generalized modus ponens, take A(cl, j3) to be MV~ and 
y to be 1, identifying _LOg with /I. 
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The r-closure of such an interesting sentence 1 is Iz, if A is O-labeled, and is 
A(-rk(-so), 61 . . . ,6,) 
otherwise, where k is the least number such that r“(+) is l-labeled. 
Notice that the r-closure of A exists (is correctly defined) because of the assumption 
that r solves 760, and note also that the r-closure of 1 continues to be interesting. 
And the h-closure of L is hk(l), where k is the least number such that hk(L) is 
l-labeled or hkf1(2.) has the same main osubsentence as hk(l). Note that the h-closure 
of 1 (is well defined and) continues to be interesting. 
We say that 1 is r- (resp. h-) closed, if its r- (resp. h-) closure is I; and 1 is 
rh-closed, if it is both r- and h-closed. 
Now, to get the sentence that we call the rh-closure of 1, we take the r-closure of 
A, then the h-closure of this r-closure, then the r-closure of this h-closure,. . . , - until 
we reach an rh-closed sentence. 
Since the operations of r- and h-closure preserve the property of being interesting 
and they can change only the main osubsentence, we have 
The rh-closure of an interesting sentence A(&, 61,. . . ,6,) 
remains interesting and it is A(&,, 61,. . . , ii,,,) for some 6;. (16) 
We simultaneously define Proponent’s effective history-sensitive strategy f together 
with two other effective functions t and g, where g assigns to every initial segment t = 
51 , . . . ,<,, of an A(y, fi)-play with this strategy of Proponent’s, with 5, = A(&, . . . , S,), 
a sentence gf = A(8 O,. . . , Sk), and tt determines traces for some surface osubsentences 
of &,, so that the following conditions are satisfied: 
Condition 1 . gs is interesting. 
Condition 2 . gt is rh-closed. 
Condition 3 . tt assigns to each 6i (1 di <m) a l-trace from 6: to 6i. 
Here is the description of f, g and t; at each step of this definition we verify that 
the above three conditions are satisfied. 
We define g(A(y, g)) to be the rh-closure of A(a, fi). And t(A(y, a)) is the tracing 
that assigns the trivial trace to each osubsentence /?i (1 d i <m). Conditions l-3 are 
evidently satisfied (for (A(y, fi)) in the role of (T)). 
Now, suppose (f) = ((I,. . . , CL), where 
4, = 460,. . . , &>, 
is an initial segment of a A(y, p)-play with Proponent’s strategy f, the functions g and 
t are defined for t, 
and conditions l-3 are satisfied. 
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Case 1: &, is l-labeled. We must only define g and t for (z, &,+I), where &+i is 
an arbitrary development of r,. We have 
5 n+l =A(60,...,6i-l,“,6i+1,...,6,) 
for some 0 Q i < m, where 0 is a development of the l-labeled 6i. Then we define 
g(k,+,) = s?. A d n we define t(z, &+I) to be the tracing that assigns to each Sj 
with 16 i <m, j # i the same trace as tt, and, if i # 0, assigns the trace (t;, a) to 0, 
where t?! is the trace assigned to 6i by t?. Conditions 1 and 2 trivially continue to be 
satisfied, and evidently condition 3, too, remains to be satisfied. 
Case 2: &, is O-labeled. We define the sequence 00,. . . , op of sentences and the 
sequence SO,. . . ,sp of tracings for 5, as follows: 
l 00 = g5 and SO = t{. By our assumption, conditions l-3 are satisfied for 00 and SO 
in the roles of gf and tf. 
l Suppose now 01 and SI are defined, and conditions l-3 are satisfied for 01 and sl 
in the roles of gT and tz. Then: 
1. If 01 has the label 0, then p = m. 
2. Suppose now OI = A(&. . ., 0,) has the label 1. Note that, as WI is r-closed, 
its main osubsentence 00 is O-labeled. Therefore, the only reason for wl’s being 
l-labeled (whereas 5, is O-labeled) can be that for some 1 d i Qm, Bi is l-labeled 
whereas 6i is O-labeled (if there are many such i, we suppose that our i is the 
smallest among them). This means that the l-trace (vi,. . .,qd) from t3i to 6i, 
assigned to 6i by sl, is not trivial (d 22). Then we define o~+i to be the rh- 
closure of 
400,. . . , ei-l,YIZIei+l,...,e,). 
And we define s[+i to be the tracing that assigns the trace (~2,. . . , vd) to 6i and 
assigns the same trace as sl to each osubsentence Sj of &, with 1 <j <m, j # i. 
It is not hard to verify that conditions l-3 are satisfied for w/+1 and s/+1 in the 
roles of gf and tf, 
Each w,,,+I is a development of o,, so the number p will sooner or later be reached. 
Thus, 
wp is O-labeled and conditions l-3 are satisfied (17) 
for q, and sp in the roles of gl and tt. 
Then, as h solves gf (condition 1 ), the value of h for u+, (is defined and) is a 
development of wP. Assume 
c+ =A(Po,...,P,). 
The h-closedness of wP implies that hw, is the result of replacing in o+, one of the 
O-labeled pi, i # 0, by a development G of pi. Then we define 
f t = A(60,. . . ,6i_l,0,6i+l,. . . ,S,). 
G. Japaridzel Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 85 (1997) 87-156 133 
We also define g( t, j-t) as the r/r-closure of hw,, and we define t(t,fz) as the tracing 
that assigns the trivial trace to a and assigns the same trace as sP to each Sj with 
l<j<m, j#i. 
Note that as pi is O-labeled and there is a l-trace from pi to 6i (determined by sP), 
we have 6i = pi. Therefore, f 5 is a development of 5,. 
It is easy to verify that ho, is interesting (taking into account that-o, is so), whence, 
by (16) s(?,S8 . . t IS m eresting. That is, condition 1 is satisfied for (<, fz). Condition 2 
is trivially satisfied because (f, ff) is an rh-closure, and condition 3 is also evident. 
Thus, f is defined for t = (li, . . . , &) as soon as 5, is O-labeled, and f f is 
a (relaxed) development of 5,. This means that f is a history-sensitive relaxed so- 
lution to A(y,p), whence, by Theorem 2.14 and Lemma 7.7, A(?,$) is effectively true 
in JH. 0 
11. Arithmetization of the game semantics of arithmetic 
We shall use CI --t /? to abbreviate TCI v p and 3xXgYc( to abbreviate 3x(x d y A ~1). 
The meanings of the abbreviations 3x,,,, VxX,,, etc. should also be clear. 
Definition 11.1. (1) The set of do-formulas is the smallest set of arithmetical formulas 
such that: 
0 atomic formulas are da-formulas; 
l if CI and /I are &-formulas, then la, CI V j? are da-formulas; 
l if ~1 is a As-formula and t is a term (see Convention 3.6) not containing x, then 
3xXG,c( is a do-formula. 
(2) “,&“-formula and “no”-formula are synonyms of “As”-formula, and for n > 1, 
we say that a formula CI is a C,- (resp. U,-) formula, if CI = 3x1 . . .3xk/? (resp. 
c1 = Vx, . . . 3xkp) for some II,_,- (resp. X,-i-) formula /? and some, possibly empty, 
sequence xi,. . . , Xk of variables. 
Note that, according to the above definition, every C,- or n,-formula is, at the same 
time, a Cn+i- and a n,,+t-formula as well. 
The meaning of the notion of C,- (resp. II,,-, As-) sentence must be clear: this is 
the result of replacing each free variable in a C,- (resp. ZI,-, do-) formula by a natural 
number (see the beginning of Section 7). 
The following fact does not require any comments: 
Fact 11.2. Truth for A0 sentences i  decidable. 
This implies a more interesting fact. 
Fact 11.3. There is an eflective strategy DZERO which is a solution to any true 
do-sentence. 
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Proof. Consider an arbitrary O-labeled true As-sentence 6. We define DZERO(G) as 
follows: 
Case 1: 6 = c11 V ~2. As 6 is a true A0 sentence, so is at least one disjunct ai of it, 
and this disjunct, in view of Fact 11.2, can be determined in an effective way. Then 
let D.ZERO(G) = a;. 
Case 2: 6 = 3x,4lu(x). Again, in an effective way can be found b with bd t such 
that u(b) is a true da-sentence. We then define DZERO(G) = a(b). 
Thus, DZERO is defined for any true O-labeled da-sentence 6 and the value of 
DZERO for 6 is a development of 6 which remains a true do-sentence. This, together 
with the observation that any development of a l-labeled true do-sentence remains a 
true do-sentence, implies that DZERO is a solution to any true da-sentence. 0 
Fact 11.4. There is an efictive strategy UNIV which is a solution to any true Ilz- 
sentence. 
Proof. Consider an arbitrary true &-sentence z. It has the form 
(possibly M, n = 0) for some do-formula ~(2, 7). The first m moves in a n-play are to 
be made by Opponent, and these moves lead to the true Cl-sentence 
0 = 3yl . ..3y.a(al,... ,hyl,...,y,) 
for some al,...,a,. At this point Proponent starts checking, one after one, all possi- 
ble n-tuples of numbers until he reaches a tuple bl, _ . . , b, such that the do-sentence 
6 = cr(at ,..., am,bl ,..., b,) is true. Such a tuple exists because (r is true, and this 
checking is effective according to Fact 11.2. After the tuple is found, Proponent makes 
n consecutive moves, each of which consists in the deleting of “3Yi” and replacing 
“Yi” by “bi”. The play comes to the sentence (position) 6. NOW Proponent can switch 
to the strategy DZERO which guarantees that Proponent wins the play. 0 
Corollary 11.5. Every true z3-sentence is efectively true. 
Proof. Indeed, suppose rs is a true &-sentence. We may suppose that cr is not a 
LIZ-sentence, for otherwise Proponent can use the strategy UNIV for it. Then (T = 
3X 1,. . . ,3x,71(x1,. . . , xn) for some &-formula n(3) and some n 2 1, and there is an 
n-tuple al, . . . , a,, of numbers such that K(J) is true. Proponent starts the play by making 
n consecutive moves, consisting in deleting the “3xi” and replacing the “xi” by “ai”, 
and this ultimately leads to the position z(Z). Now Proponent can switch to the strategy 
UNIV. This guarantees a win for him. Cl 
Definition 11.6. We say that an arithmetical formula a(xt, _. . ,x,), with exactly xl,. . . , 
x, free, represents (in the standard model) an n-place relation A on natural numbers, 
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if for any natural numbers al,. . . ,a,, the relation A(ai,. . . ,a,) holds if and only if 
4m,..., a,) is true in the standard model. 
It is well known that 
Fact 11.7. Any decidable relation can be represented by a ZI-formula. 
As the negation of a decidable relation remains decidable, it is clear that “c” can 
be replaced by “II” above. 
Let us fix some good coding of finite functions of the type NAT -+ NAT. For 
example, if such a function f is defined exactly for al,. . . , e, and its values for these 
arguments are bl , . . . , b,, then let the code off be a (the) standard code of the sequence 
((al,bl),...,(an,bn)). 
And we understand a partial recursive function f as a Turing machine, which allows 
us to speak about the code of such a function. For a machine f and a natural number i, 
we define a one-place function f 6i as follows: For any argument n E NAT, 
l if n <i and for the input n the machine f halts within <i steps and outputs a natural 
number m 9 then f”‘(n) = rn’ 7 
l otherwise f Gi is undefined for n. 
Note that f 6i is a finite function. Note also that for any machine f and any numbers 
6 112, 
f(n) = m iff f”‘(n) = m for some i. (18) 
Convention 11.8. Under the standard Godel numbering, not every natural number is the 
code of something. However, it is convenient to sometimes abuse terminology and say 
“the x-coded sentence (formula, finite function,. . .>“, as this is done in the following 
“definition”: 
FOO(x) is the fnnction that returns the code of the negation of the x-coded 
sentence. 
In such a case we will mean that FOO returns 0, if x is not the code of a sentence. 
Similarly, if FOO is defined as a predicate and the body of the definition somewhere 
says “. . . the x-coded sentence.. “, we suppose that FOO returns “false” as soon as the 
argument x is not the code of a sentence. 
We fix the following four arithmetical formulas: 
l Won4(x, y,z, i) is a formula defining the following 4-place relation: “(the x-coded 
sentence)-play with Proponent’s strategy (the y-coded machine)“’ and Opponent’s 
strategy (the z-coded finite function) is won”. 
As for any y and i the one-place functions (the y-coded machine)“‘(. . .) and (the 
y-coded finite fnnction)(. . .) are both finite and Zy(. . .) and . . . Ry . . . are decidable, it is 
easy to see that the predicate Won4 is decidable. Therefore, we suppose that Won4(x, y, 
z, i) is a Ci -formula. 
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0 Won3(n,y,z) = 3iWon4(x, y,z,i); Won3 is a Cl-formula. 
0 SoZves(y,x) = VzWon3(x, y,z); Solves is a ZYZ2,-formula. 
l Eftrue(x) = ClySolves(y,x); Eftrue is a &formula. 
In view of (18), it is evident that Won3(x, y,z) represents the 3-place predicate “(the 
x-coded sentence)-play with Proponent’s strategy (the y-coded machine) and Oppo- 
nent’s strategy (the z-coded finite function) is won”. 
And in view of Fact 2.10, Solves(y,x) represents the predicate “(the y-coded ma- 
chine) is a solution to (the x-coded sentence)“. 
Finally, Eftrue(x) clearly represents the predicate “(the x-coded sentence) is effec- 
tively true in the standard model”. 
Thus, the predicate of effective truth of an arithmetical sentence has the complexity 
Zs, which contrasts with the well-known nonarithmeticity of classical truth. 
Definition 11.9. Let LX(X) be an arithmetical formula with only x free, and h(yt , . . . , yn) 
be an n-ary primitive recursive function. We say that a Proponent’s strategy f is stable 
for (cr(x),h(yt,.. .,y,,)), if for any numbers a,bl,. ., b, such that a = h(bl,..., b,,), 
whenever f solves the sentence a(a), it also solves the sentence a(h(bl, . . . , b,)) (recall 
Convention 3.6). 
Lemma 11.10. Let U(X) be an arithmetical formula with only x free, h(yl,. ..,yn) 
be an nary primitive recursive function and f be a Proponent’s effective strategy. 
Then f “can be made” stable for (a(x), f (yl,. . .,y,)). More precisely, there is a 
Proponent’s effective strategy f’ stable for (a(x), f(yl,. . .,y,,)) such that for any 
number a, f’ solves g(a) whenever f does. 
Proof. Assume a = h(bl, . . , b,). Here is an informal description of Proponent’s strat- 
egy f’: 
In a a(a)-play, f’ acts exactly as f. In a a(h(bl, . . , b,))-play, Proponent pretends 
that he sees “a” instead of “h(bl,. . . , b,,)“, and again acts exactly as he would act in 
a a(a)-play following strategy f: chooses the same disjunct when he sees an additive 
disjunction, chooses the same parameter when he sees an existential (osub)sentence, 
etc. Note that this is possible because the sentences a(a) and a(h(bl,. . ., b,)) have 
exactly the same logical structure and they only differ by their atoms (see the end of 
the second paragraph of Convention 3.6); also, any atomic sentence which emerges 
in this a(h(bl, . . , b,))-play with strategy f’ has the same truth value (label) as the 
corresponding atom in the corresponding cr(a)-play with strategy f. Clearly, then f’ 
is an effective solution to a(h(bl,. . . , b,)) whenever f (and f ‘) is so to u(a). 0 
12. Safe countertrees 
Throughout this section “(hyper)sentence” means that of L. 
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Terminology and Notation 12.1. By a tree we mean a set T of natural numbers, 
whose elements are called nodes of T, together with a binary relation + on T such 
that: 
l 4 is transitive and irreflexive; 
l ifa+candb+c,theneithera+borb+aora=b(alla,b,cET); 
l there is a node r E T, called the root of T, such that Y 4 a for all r # a E T. 
If there are no infinite or arbitrarily long +-chains in T, we say that T has a jinite 
height and call the length h of the longest (a longest) chain ai 4 . . -: ah the height 
of the tree. 
a < b is defined as a + b or a = b. If a < b (resp. u + b), we say that a is an 
ancestor (resp. proper ancestor) of b, and b is a descendant (resp. proper descendant) 
of a. 
If a + b and there is no c with a 4 c 3 b, we say that a is the parent of b and b 
is a child of a. 
We say that a and b are siblings, if a and b have a common parent. A proper sibling 
of a is any sibling of a except a itself. 
A tree of sentences is a tree T with each node a of which is associated a sen- 
tence ;i, called the content of a. We often identify nodes with their contents, al- 
though it should be remembered that different nodes do not necessarily have different 
contents. 
Definition 12.2. A sentence is said to be safe, if no atom has two weak surface oc- 
currences in it (recall Terminology and Notation 6(2)). For example, 
P(3) n +(2) is safe, but P(3) n +‘(3) is not. 
Definition 12.3. A countertree for a sentence CI is a tree T of sentences (which are 
viewed as clean hypersentences, see Terminology and Notation 6.1(6) with the root ‘2 
such that for any node /?: 
l if p is l-like, then it has exactly one child, and this child is a 1-hyperdevelopment 
of P; 
l if p is O-like, then every clean 0-hyperdevelopment of p is a child of /I and every 
child of j3 is a clean 0-hyperdevelopment of fi. 
Such a tree is said to be safe, if every node of it is safe. And this tree is said to 
be primitive recursive, if the relations “. . . is a node of T”, ‘&. . is the content of . . .“, 
“ . . is the parent of . . .“, “. . . is a sibling of . . .” are primitive recursive. 
Remark 12.4. Note that a child is always a hyperdevelopment of its parent which, by 
Lemma 6.7(a), implies that a countertree always has a finite height. 
In the notion of translation defined in Section 5, instead of the language of arithmetic 
can be taken any other language, including the language L whose formulas are to be 
translated. Below we define a translation from L into L: 
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Definition 12.5. Let a be a sentence with a hypercomplexity n, and zi, . . . ,zzn be the 
first 2n variables (in the alphabetical list of variables) not occurring in cz. Then we 
define the plus-translation + for a by stipulating that for any m-ary predicate letter P 
of Lx, 
+P = t/z,322 ...vz2n_,3Z*nP(Xi )...) x,,z ,,..., Z&). 
(We assume here that if P is an m-ary predicate letter of L, then it is an m + 2n-ary 
predicate letter as well; if this seems confusing, we can choose any “safe” (m +2n)-ary 
predicate letter P’ instead of P on the right-hand side of the above equation.) 
Lemma 12.6. If a sentence a does not belong to ET, then there is a safe primitive 
recursive countertree for ci+, where + is the plus-translation for a. 
Proof. ’ Assume CI # ET. We simultaneously define a tree T of sentences and a function 
which assigns to each node p of T a hypersentence /Y called the image of j?, such 
that the following two conditions are satisfied. 
Condition 1. If fi=A!(yi,...,yk), then /?‘=A!(~I,...,&), where for each l<idk: 
(a) if 6i is not a sliteral, then yi = S1?; 
(b) if 6i is a sliteral, then yi is an it-development of St (see Terminology 
note that in which model we take an t-t-development does not matter here). 
Condition 2. 8’ $! ET. 
2.2(2); 
Extending the usage of the word “image”, we also say that each 6i in Condition 1 
above is the image of yi; if the image of yi is an osliteral, then we say that yi is a 
quasiosliteral. We can say that a quasiosliteral is positive, negative, single, or married, 
if its image is so, and that two quasiosliterals are spouses to each other, if their images 
are so. 
According to Condition l(b), every quasiosliteral with an image P(d) (where P(Z) 
is a positive or negative sliteral), is 
Qi+lzi+l. . . Q2n~2nP(ii,bl,...,bi,Zi+l,...,~2n) 
for some O<i<2n and bl,..., bi (where the Qj are alternating quantifiers). We call 
the number i the age of the quasiosliteral, and if i 22, we say that the quasiosliteral 
is aged. And we call a parameter bj (1 <j < i) the zj-parameter of the quasiosliteral. 
We put OZ+ to be the root of T and 01 to be its image. Clearly, Conditions 1 and 2 
are satisfied. 
Now, suppose p = A!(yi,..., ok) is a node of T, /?’ = A!(&, . . . , &) is its image 
and Conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied for /? and p’. Below we define the set of children 
8 This proof takes all the rest of this section. Reading it is not necessary for understanding the material in 
the remaining sections. 
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of /I and the images of these children; at the same time we verify that /I satisfies the 
conditions of Definition 12.3 and the children of /I together with their images satisfy 
Conditions 1 and 2. Here we go: 
Case 1: Suppose p is l-like and: 
Subcase la: /I’ is l-like. Then (as /?’ @ ET) there is a 1-hyperdevelopment 4’ $! ET 
of /3’; if there is more than one such hyperdevelopment, we choose the smallest one. 
We have 
for some 1 <i < k, where 6 is a (hyper)development of the A- or V-sentence 6i. Then, 
as it is easily seen, the formula 
is a 1-hyperdevelopment of p. We set 4 to be the only child of j3 and 4’ to be its 
image. Note that Conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied for 4 and $J’, and /I satisfies the 
conditions of Definition 12.3. 
Subcuse lb: j?’ is O-like. Let then I be the smallest hyperlabeling for p’ such that 
1@‘) = 0. It is easy to see that there is then a smallest 1 < i < k such that di is an 
osliteral with l(Si) = 0, and yi has the opposite hyperlabel (for any hyperlabeling, 
because fi is clean), which means - taking into account that yi is a r&development of 
ST and the latter is a sliteral with a quantifier prefix - that yi has the form Vzjy(zj) for 
some 1 Gj < 2n. We then choose the least parameter a not occurring in p and stipulate 
that 
4 = 4~1 ,...,yi-l,y(a),yi+l,...,Yk) 
is the only child of /? and the selfsame p’ is its image. Clearly, Conditions 1 and 2 
continue to hold for 4 and /I’, and j? satisfies the conditions of Definition 12.3. 
Case 2: Suppose fl is O-like. Then we stipulate that all clean 0-hyperdevelopments of 
p, and only those, are children of /I, Thus, p satisfies the conditions of Definition 12.3. 
Consider any clean 0-hyperdevelopment (child) 4 of B. We have 
4 = 4~1, . . ..Yi-l.YIYi+l,...,yk) 
for some i, where yi is a V- or g-sentence and y is its development. In order to define 
the image 4’ of 4, we need to consider the following subcases: 
Subcuse 2a: yi is not a quasiosliteral. Then it is clear that there is 6 such that y = 6+ 
and 6 is a 0-hyperdevelopment of 6i. Then we define 
Subcuse 2b: yi is a single quasiosliteral of age 1, and there is an (exactly one single) 
aged quasiosliteral yj in 4 such that 6i and Sj are opposite to each other and yj and 
y have the same zt- and zz-parameters. Then 4’ is the marriage-extension of p by 
means of adding to the set of married couples of the latter the couple (Si,Sj). 
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Subcase 2c. In all the remaining cases we define $4 = B’. 
Condition 1, as it is easily seen, is satisfied for 4 and I$’ in each of the above 
subcases (a)-(c); as p’ 6 ET, Condition 2 is trivially satisfied in the subcase (c), and 
it is also satisfied in subcases (a) and (b) because 4’ is a 0-hyperdevelopment of fi’ 
(see Lemma 6.15). 
Since tl is the root of T and, as we established above, every node B of T satisfies 
the conditions of Definition 12.3, T is a countertree for a. And it is evident that this 
tree is primitive recursive. It remains to show that T is safe. 
Suppose ci = A!(at,. . ., ak) is a node of T, ai is a quasiosliteral of a and fi is 
a descendant of a. The definition of countertree easily implies that then 1 has the 
form A@l,...,bk); we extend the usage of the words “ancestor” and “descendant” to 
osubsentences of the nodes of T and say that c(i (1 d i< k) is an ancestor of pi and 
pi is a descendant of ai. In a similar way, we extend the usage of the words “parent” 
and “child” to quasiosliterals. 
An analysis of our step-by-step construction of T easily convinces as that the fol- 
lowing lemma holds for T. 
Lemma 12.7. (a) Zf a node OL is a child of a node /3 and a’,/? are the images of cr,p, 
respectively, then either ~1’ = p’ or CI’ is a hyperdevelopment of p’. 
(b) Zf y is a (surface) quasiosliteral of a node, then so are all its descendants, and 
they all have the same image. 
(c) A surface osubsentence y of a node is a quasiosliteral IY y is Qtzi . .. Qz,z& 
for some literal 6 and some 1 Q i <2n, where the Qj are alternating quanttfiers. 
(d) rf two quasiosliterals of a node are spouses to each other, then so are their 
descendants. (This follows from (a) and (b)) 
Lemma 12.8. Suppose p is a node of T and y and 6 are dtrerent positive (resp. 
negative) aged quasiosliterals of /I. Then the zl- (resp. zz-) parameters of y and 6 
are deferent. 
Proof. Taking Lemma 12.7(c) into account, one can verify that if y and /? are positive 
(resp. negative) aged quasiosliterals, then the zr- (resp. zl-) parameters have appeared 
in them - that is, in their ancestors - by the subcase lb; but, on one hand, a zi-para- 
meter, once it has appeared, never disappears in the descendants, and, on the other 
hand, the subcase lb never introduces an already existing parameter, so we conclude 
that the zi- (resp. zz-) parameters of y and 6 must be different. 0 
Lemma 12.9. Suppose /? is a node of T and y and b are quasiosliterals of /I?. Then 
y and 6 are spouses to each other tf and only tf the following two conditions are 
satisfied: 
(a) both y and 6 are aged, 
(b) y has the same zt- and q-parameters as 6. 
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Proof. (3:) It is only the subcase 2b where marriages happen. In view of Lemma 
12.7(d) and (a), conditions of the subcase 2b then immediately imply both clauses (a) 
and (b) of the lemma. 
(+=:) We may suppose that y became aged earlier than 6. More precisely, for some 
/I’, p”, y’, y”, 6’, ~3” we have: p’, /I” are ancestor nodes of j, pll is a child of /I’, y’ and 
y” are the ancestors of y in j?’ and fi”, respectively, and 6’ and 6” are the ancestors 
of 6 in /3’ and /I”, respectively; y’ = y” and they are aged; 6’ is of age 1 and 6” is 
of age 2. By Lemma 12.7(c), y’, y”, a’, 6” are quasiosliterals, and by Lemma 12.7(b), 
y’, y”, y have a common image and so do 6’,6”,6. Note that the subcases la and 2a 
never deal with quasiosliterals and the subcase lb never introduces an already existing 
parameter. Therefore, the transfer from j?’ to fl” can only be determined either by the 
subcase 2b or by the subcase 2c. If this is the subcase 2b, we are done, because that 
means that y” and 6” marry each other in j3” and therefore, by Lemma 12.7(d), y and 
6 are spouses to each other. It remains to show that the subcase 2c is ruled out, i.e. 
that the transfer from p’ to /I” is really determined by the subcase 2b. Suppose not. 
Then an analysis of the conditions of subcase 2b shows that we should have one of 
the following: 
(i) There is a quasiosliteral 5 # y’ in /I’ with the same zi- and zz-parameters as S” 
such that the image of t is opposite to the image of a’, or 
(ii) Either y’ or 6’ is married. 
In the case (i), note that 5 and y’ have the same zl- and z2-parameters and equal 
images, which, by Lemma 12.8, is a contradiction. 
Now, to rule out the case (ii), first notice that since 6’ is not aged, by Lemma 
12.9(a), 6’ is not married. And if y’ is married, then (the child of) its spouse has 
the same (same as a sentence) image and (by Lemma 12.9(b)) the same zi- and 
z2-parameters as V, which, again by Lemma 12.8, is a contradiction. 0 
Let /I be a node of T and (ys, yi) - a married couple of quasiosliterals of p. Then 
we will say that this couple, as well as each yi, is spoiled (in /I), if for some m, one 
of the following holds: 
(a) both yi are of (not necessarily the same) age am and their z,-parameters are 
different, or 
(b) yi is of age Bm, yl-i of age < m and the variable z, in yi-i is bound by V. 
Lemma 12.10. Let j be a node of T, 6 a child of j and (~0, yl) a married couple 
of quasiosliterals of j?. Then, if this couple is spoiled in j, so is it (i.e. the couple of 
the children of yo, ~1) in 6. 
Proof. Indeed, if the reason of ys and yi’s being spoiled in b is the clause (a) of 
the definition of “spoiled”, then clearly the same reason will work in 6, too. And if 
the reason for being spoiled in p is the clause (b) of the definition of “spoiled”, then, 
again, the same reason remains in 6 unless 6 results from p by deleting Vzi, in 71-i 
and replacing the variable z, by a parameter a (this can only happen in the subcase 
142 G. JaparidzeIAnnals of Pure and Applied Logic 85 {1997) 87-156 
lb of the definition of T). But then, according to the conditions of the subcase lb, 
this z,-parameter a is different from any already existing parameter of /?, including the 
z,-parameter of yi. This means that the interesting us couple is spoiled in 6 on the 
basis of the clause (a) of the definition of “spoiled”. 0 
Lemma 12.11. Suppose p is a node of T and y is a married quasiosliteral of j3 whose 
first quantiJier is V and whose age is m. Suppose also that p’ is a descendant of fi 
and the descendant y’ of the quasiosliteral y in B’ is of age m + 2. Then B and p’ 
have diflerent images unless y’ is spoiIed. 
Proof. For a contradiction, deny this. y and y’ must have the forms Vzz,+t3z,+20(z,+r, 
zm+2) and o(a,b), respectively. We must have nodes flt,/?z with j3 =$ Bt + /_?2 -X p’, 
where /?2 is a child of /It, such that, if we denote by yt and y2 the descendants of 
y in /?I and 82, respectively, we have yt = y = Vzim+t32,+2~(zm+l,z,+2) and y2 = 
3zm+2w(a,z,+2). Note that all the four nodes: /I,/?,, /32,/I’ have the same image I,, and 
that, by Lemma 12.7(c) and (b), all the four osliterals y, yt, ~2, y’ are quasiosliterals 
with a common image Z,. Note also that the transfer from /It to /?2 can only be 
determined by the subcase lb, which means that 1s is O-like. Let then 1 be the smallest 
hyperlabeling with l(fg) = 0. Let 6 and 6’ be the spouses of y and y’, respectively. 
By Lemmas 12.9(a), 12.7(c) and (b), these two osliterals are quasiosliterals with a 
common image Ia which clearly (as a sentence) equals ~1~. The subcase lb implies 
that I(Z,) = 0 and hence l(ls) = 1. 
As we assume, y’ is not spoiled. Then Lemma 12.10 implies that y is not spoiled, 
either. Remembering that y is an rt-development of I,’ and 6 is an rt-development 
of 1; = -I,‘, a little analysis of the definition of “spoiled” convinces us that then 
b = kn+1b?l+2 TO(Z~+~,Z,+~) and 6’ = ~o(a, b). This means that there are nodes 
P3, P4 with P + P3 -X 84 $ P’, where /IId is a child of /I3, such that, if we denote by 83 
and & the descendants of 6 in j?3 and PA, respectively, we have 83 = ‘dztm+2-4u,zm+2) 
and 64 = -o(a,b). Clearly, IS is the image of both 83,64. Again, the transfer from 
ps to /Id could only have taken place by the subcase 1 b, with 83 in the role of yi of 
the latter. But this is impossible because, as we already know, l(I6) = 1, whereas lb 
requires that 1(Za) = 0. 
Lemma 12.12. T is safe. 
Proof. Suppose, for a contradiction, fi is a node of T containing two surface occur- 
rences of one and the same atom. Denote the corresponding osubsentences - of course 
they must be quasiosiiterals - by y and 6. The age of these quasiosliterals is 2n and, 
as n # 0, they are aged, which, by Lemma 12.9 means that they are spouses to each 
other. Let /3t be the most remote ancestor of jI in which (the ancestors of) y and 6 
first became spouses. The age of at least one of these two spouses in /3t should be ex- 
actly 2 (and 1 in the parent of /?I), for otherwise Lemma 12.9 implies that their parents 
(already) were spouses to each other. We may suppose that y is the quasiosliteral whose 
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ancestor in fit was of age 2. Let us then fix proper descendants 82 + . . . 4 /?,, < /I 
of the node bt such that for each 2< j<n, the age of the ancestor of y in fij is 2j. 
Since y is not spoiled in fi, by Lemma 12.10, its ancestors in /?I,, . . , b,, are not spoiled 
either, whence Lemma 12.11 easily implies that the image /3: of each such fij is differ- 
ent from the image /?J_, of pi-t. Then, by Lemma 12.7(a), we have that /?‘,H.. .I@;, 
where H is the transitive closure of the hyperdevelopment relation. This means that the 
hypercomplexity of /?‘, is an. But the hypercomplexity of /?{ is less than that of the 
original formula CI (for, J?i contains a married couple but c1 does not). Consequently, 
the hypercomplexity of a is greater than n, which is a contradiction (recall that n was 
just the hypercomplexity of a). 0 
Lemma 12.12 completes the proof of Lemma 12.6. •i 
Now we are ready for a finishing stroke. 
13. Proof of Theorem 5.5@&+(i) 
This part of Theorem 5.5 could be called the arithmetical completeness of ET. 
Lemma 13.1. If there is a safe primitive recursive countertree for a sentence CI of L, 
then there is an arithmetical translation z for a such that a’ is not eflectively true in 
the standard model of arithmetic. 
Proof. Let us fix a safe primitive recursive countertree T for tl. For simplicity and, 
without loss of generality, we assume that T is infinite, every natural number is its 
node and 0 is its root. From now on, “node”, “parent”, etc. will mean those in T. 
We also fix the set {PI,. . . ,P,} of all predicate letters of ~1. And for each i with 
1 < i <n we say that a sentence /3 of arithmetic is e-appropriate, if /I contains exactly 
as many free variables as the arity of Pi, and if, at the same time, B does not contain 
variables (no matter free or bound) occurring in a. 
First we need to introduce notations for some functions and relations. 
l By abuse of notation, we use ? to denote the function of x that returns the code of 
the content of node x (recall from Terminology and Notation 12.1 that we also use 
the same expression to denote this content itself). 
l transl(x, tl, . . . , t, ) is the (n + 1 )-place function that returns the code of the sentence 
S’, where S is the x-coded sentence and z is the translation that is defined exactly 
for the predicate letters PI,. . . , P, and assigns to each fi the ti-coded &-appropriate 
formula (recall Convention 11.8). 
l Parent@, y) is the relation “x is the parent of y”. 
l S&1(x, y) is the relation “x and y are siblings”. 
l Contuins(x, y) is the relation “The x-coded sentence has a surface occurrence of the 
y-coded sentence”. 
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0 For a formula B(xi,, . . ,Xk) of arithmetic or of L with exactly xi,. . . ,Xk free, we 
use [PI (or [Pb,..., Xk)]) to denote the k-place primitive recursive function that 
assigns to each k-tuple al,. . . , ak of numbers the code of the sentence /?(ai, . . . , ak); 
we assume that the term (see Convention 3.6) [/?(xi,. . . ,Xk)] has exactly the same 
free variables x1 , . . . ,Xk as the formula fl(xi,. . . , xk), Note that if B has no free 
variables, then [/I] is simply the code of p. 
l &,.Yl,..., yn) is the (n + 1 )-place function that returns the code of the sentence 
that is the result of, respectively, substituting the numbers yr, . . . , y, for the variables 
“tl”, . . . ,“t,,” in the x-coded formula. 
l (s)i is the 2-place function that returns the ith term of the s-coded finite nonempty 
sequence of numbers. 
l Ih(s) is the function that returns the length of the s-coded finite nonempty sequence 
of numbers. 
It is easily seen that these functions and relations are primitive recursive. 
Now, recalling the definition of the predicate Solves from Section 11, abbreviating 
t1,..., t, by z and using “4 + I/?’ for “+I$ V $“, we define 
Spec(u, i) = 3s(Solues(s, trunsl(ij, T)) A Vu’Vs’ 
(2”’ .3” < 2” .3’ A Sibl(v, v’) ---t Golues(s’, trunsl(Z+, Z)))). 
Explanation: The function 2’. 3” is used to encode pairs (v, s) of natural numbers. And 
? is in fact a variable for translations. Introducing some apparently not very adequate 
jargon, we can say that Spec(v,z) asserts that, under the translation ?, the node v has 
the shortest effective solution among its siblings. More precisely this means that the 
ctranslation of ii has an effective solution s such that there is no pair (u’,s’) smaller 
than (s, u) where v’ is a sibling of u and s’ is an effective solution to the ?-translation 
OfY. 
Next, we define 
Superspec(v, 3)= 3((s), = 0 A (s)lj+j = v 
A% ai4(s)Parent((s)i, (s)i+~) 
A% 6i4wSpec((s)i, f)). 
Using our jargon, Superspec(v, 7) asserts that under the translation c every ancestor of 
the node v (including v) has the shortest effective solution among its siblings. 
For every i with 1 <i dn, let mi be the code of the formula 
h( contbns(~, [+j(z], . . . &,)I) 
ASuperspec(v,su(tl, tl,. , . , tn), . . . ,su(t,, tl,. . . , t,))), (19) 
where ki is the arity of Pi and where we assume that none of the variables of this 
formula occurs in c(. 
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We now define the translation r: r is a finite function defined just for PI,. . . , P, such 
that for every i with 1 bi Gn, 
T(Pi) = 3v( Contains(ij, [lPi(Zl, . . . ,Zk, )]) 
ASuperspec(v,su(m~, ml,. . . , m,), . . . ,su(m,,ml, . . . ,m,))>. 
Lemma 13.2. For each i with 1 <i Gn, 
Proof. Indeed, su(mi,ml, . . . , m,) represents the code of the formula which is the result 
of, respectively, substituting the numbers mt, , . . , m, for the variables “tt”, . . . , “tn” in 
the mi-coded formula, i.e. in the formula (19), and (P;:(zi,. . .,zk,))T is just such a 
formula. 0 
We now introduce the following abbreviation: 
xT 2 transl(x,su(ml,ml, . . . ,m,), . . . ,su(m,, ml,. . . , m,)). 
Lemma 13.3. For any sentence y, [y]” = [y’]. 
Proof. Indeed, in view of Lemma 13.2, x7 is the function of x that returns the code 
of S’, where S is the x-coded sentence. 0 
Let now 
Special(v) 
E Spec(v,su(m,,ml,..., m,) ,..., su(m,,ml,..., m,)) 
and 
Superspecial( v)
= Superspec(v,su(ml,ml,. . . ,m,), . . . ,su(m,,mI,. . . ,m,)). 
That is, if we unfold the abbreviations Spec and Superspec in the above formulas 
and use the abbreviation x7, we have 
Special(v) 2 3s(Solves(s,?) A Wfst 
(2” .3” < 2’ .3” A Sib&v, v’) -+ Golves(s’,T?‘))) 
and 
Superspecial = Cls((s)l = 0 
Ns)lh(s) = v 
A& <iilh(,)ParM(s)i, (S)i+l 1 
AVil~isrh(s)Special((s)i)). 
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We will say that a node c is special, if Special(c) is true which, using our jargon, 
means that under the translation r, c has the shortest effective solution among its 
siblings. 
And we say that a node c is super-special, if Superspecial is true, i.e. c and all 
its ancestors are special. 
Then, for each 1 <i<n and al ,..., ak,, <!(a, ,..., ak,) asserts that there is a super- 
special node with a surface occurrence of the sliteral lZ’i(al,. . . ,ak,). 
Lemma 13.4. For any number pu, if Special(p,) is true, then it is effectively true. 
Proof. Suppose SpeciaZ(p,) is true. Let then ps be a parameter for which the sentence 
Solves(p,, g,‘) A W/s’ 
(2”’ . 3” < 2P” . 3Ps A Sibl(p,, v’) + -Solves(s’,3’T)) (20) 
is true. Then both its conjuncts are true. Let 
be all pairs (a, b) such that 2” . 3b < 2pr .3J’s and a is a sibling of pO, The truth of the 
second conjunct of (20) means that for each 1 <i<k, the &-sentence +301ues(bi,;;,‘) 
is true and hence, by Corollary 11.5, has an effective solution gi. Fix this finite list 
gl,...,gk 
of effective solutions to 
4olves(bl,iil), . . . , -SohIes(bk,&). 
Now we describe Proponent’s trategy for Speciat(p,): First, Proponent goes from 
the position Special(p,) to the position (20) (i.e. deletes “3s” and in what remains 
substitutes the parameter ps for the variable s). By Fact 2.9, it suffices to show that 
Proponent’s trategy solves (20), and this means that it solves both its conjuncts. But 
the first conjunct is a true Zi’z-sentence and, therefore, Proponent can use strategy 
UNZV for it (see Fact 11.4). As for the second conjunct, Proponent’s trategy should 
be able to solve the sentence 
72” . 3b < 2pV . 3ps V +ibl( pu, a) V +3olves(b,?) (21) 
for any parameters a, 6. If one of the first two disjuncts of this disjunction is true, let 
Proponent go from (21) to this disjunct and then use strategy UNIV. Otherwise, i.e. 
if 2a . 3b < 2Pl .3fi and a and pv are siblings, then for some 1 <i <k, (a, b) = (ai, bi). 
Let in this case Proponent go to the third conjunct and then use the strategy gi for it. 
This strategy is an effective solution to Speciul(p,). 0 
Lemma 13.5. For any node a, if Superspecial is true, then it is effectively true. 
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Proof. Suppose a is superspecial. Let the nodes al,. . . , a,,, be such that al is the root, 
a - a and for each 1 =$i < m, ai is the parent of ai+,. And let b be the code of m- 
the sequence ~],...,a,. For each 1 <i <m, a; is special and hence, by Lemma 13.4, 
Special(Q) is effectively true, so let us fix effective solutions 
to 
Speciul(al ), . . . , Special(a,). 
Here is Proponent’s strategy for Superspecial( i.e. for 
First, Proponent deletes “3s” and substitutes the parameter b for the variable s, coming 
to the position 
(bh = 0 
A(b)w) = a 
Ah <i<rh(b$‘arent((b)i, bh+l) 
AVil ~i4rh(b,Special((b)i). 
(22) 
Now Proponent must have a winning strategy for each of the four conjuncts of this 
sentence. The first three conjuncts are true da-sentences and strategy UNIV (as well 
as DZERO) can be used for them. As for the fourth conjunct, i.e. 
Vi(Tl <i < lb(b) V Special((b) 
to solve it means to solve, for each c, the true sentence 
-1 <cd /h(b) V Speciul((b),). 
This is done as follows: if the first conjunct, which is a de-sentence, is true, then 
Proponent chooses it and uses for it strategy UNIV. Otherwise Proponent chooses 
the second conjunct and uses the strategy gC for it; in view of Lemma 11.10, we 
may suppose that gC is stable for (SpeciuZ(x),(y)z), and this means that gC solves 
SpeciuZ((b),). 0 
Lemma 13.6. Zf a node b is special, then there is an efSective function which is a 
solution to every sentence 4pecial(a) where a is a proper sibling of b. 
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Proof. Suppose b is special. Let us then fix p such that 
Sofves( p,i;) is true 
and for any sibling a of b, 
(23) 
V~‘(72~ ~3”’ < 2b . 3p V +?oZues(s’,Z)) is true. (24) 
Let then (al,dl),..., (ak,dk) be all pairs (a,d) such that 2*. 3’ < 2b. 3*. By (24), for 
each 1 <i Q k, the &-sentence GofUes(di,G~) is true and, by Corollary 11.5, has an 
effective solution gi. Fix these solutions 
gl,...,gk 
to 
+oZues(d,,i?;), . . . , -soh?S(dk,;ik'). 
We now describe a Proponent’s strategy which is a solution to every sentence 
+pecial(a) where a is a sibling of b. A strategy solves Xi’pecial(a), i.e. 
V3&ls’(2” . 3” < 2” . 3’ A SibZ(a, u’) A Solues(~‘,ii’~))), 
if it solves the sentence 
-Solues(d, 2’) V 311’3s’ 
(2” . 3” < 2a . 3d A Sib&a, u’) A Solues(s’,ij’*)) 
for any d. 
(25) 
This is how Proponent should act for (25): 
If the pair (a,d) is such that a is a sibling of b and 2b . 3J’ < 2’ . 3d, then 
let Proponent choose the right disjunct of (25), then delete in it “~&IS’“’ and in 
what remains substitute b and p for u’ and s’, respectively. The play comes to the 
position 
2’ .3P < 2’ ’ 3d A Sibi(a, b) A Solues( p,;‘). (26) 
Now Proponent must be able to solve each of the three conjuncts of (26). But these 
conjuncts are true IIz-sentences, so Proponent can use UNIV. 
Suppose now a is a sibling of b and not 2b . 3P < 2a . 3d, which means that (as 
a # b) 2a . 3d < 2b . 3P and thus, for some 1 <i < k, (a,d) = (ai,ci). Then Proponent 
chooses the left disjunct of (25) and then uses the strategy gi for it. 
It is easily seen that we have just described an effective solution to any +pecial(a) 
where a is a sibling of b. 0 
We say that a node a of T is a nonbranch relative of a node b, if a # b and a is 
neither an ancestor nor a descendant of b, i.e. a and b do not belong to one branch of 
the tree. Otherwise a and b are branch relatives. 
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Lemma 13.7. If a node b is superspecial, then there is an effective function which is 
a solution to every sentence -Superspecial where a is a nonbranch relative of b. 
Proof. Let bl, . . . , b, be such that bl is the root, b, = b and, for each e with 1 <e < 
m, b, is the parent of be+,. Since b is superspecial, all the b, are special, which, by 
Lemma 13.6, means that for each 1 <e <m, there is an effective function ge which 
solves GpeciaZ(d) for every proper sibling d of b,. Let us fix these functions 
g1,...,gm. 
Our strategy must solve the sentence 
l(C), = 0 
vet+) = a 
V% ~i<Ih(c)~Parent((c)i, (C)i+1 1 
V3il ~i4Ih(c)lSpeciaZ((c)i) 
for any nonbranch relative a of b and any c. Note that if a is a nonbranch relative of 
a superspecial node, then it is not superspecial, and the above sentence is true. This is 
how Proponent acts in this case to solve that sentence. 
If one of the first three disjuncts is true, then Proponent chooses this disjunct and 
uses strategy UNIV for it. 
Suppose now the first three disjuncts are false. Then Proponent goes to the position 
3i( 1 f i < Zh(c) A GpeciaZ((c)i)). (27) 
Note that in this case c really codes a sequence cl ,...,ck such that ct is the root, 
ck = a and for each 1 <i < k, ci is the parent of ci+t. Let j be the biggest number 
such that cj is a common ancestor of a and b (which means that cj = bj), and let 
p = j + 1. Clearly, p <m, k and bp and cp are proper siblings. Proponent effectively 
finds p and goes from (27) to the sentence 
1 d p < Zh(c) A -SpeciaZ((c),). (28) 
The first conjunct of (28) is now solved by UNIV. And for the second conjunct 
Proponent uses strategy gp. In view of Lemma 11.10, we may suppose that gp is stable 
for (+‘peciaZ(x),(y),), and then we have that gp solves +peciaZ((c)r). 0 
Lemma 13.8. Zf < is a surface osliteral of a superspecial node, then -5” is effectively 
true. 
Proof. Suppose a is a superspecial node and 5 is a surface osliteral of (the content 
of) a. We need to consider two cases. Begin with the simpler one. 
Case 1: 5 is a negated atom +(bl,.. .,b,). Then -5’ = (P(bl,..., b,))T is the true 
sentence 
3v( Contains@, [+(b,, . . . , b,)]) A SuperspeciaZ(v)). (29) 
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By Lemma 13.5, there is an effective solution g (fix it) to Superspecial( The fol- 
lowing effective strategy of Proponent’s is a solution to (29): first Proponent goes from 
(29) to 
Contains(2, [-IP(~~, . . . , b,,,)]) A Superspeciul(a). (30) 
Then Proponent uses UNZV for the left conjunct and the strategy g for the right one. 
Case 2: 5 is an atom P(bl,. . ., b,). Then -e is the sentence 
~v(--rContuins(~, [TP(bl,. . . , b,)]) V Guperspeciul(v)). 
First let us check that 
(31) 
Any node with a surface occurrence of TP(bl, . . . ,b,) 
is a nonbrunch relative of a. (32) 
Indeed, suppose, for a contradiction, there is a branch relative c of a with a surface 
occurrence of lP(bl, . . . , b,). It is an evident property of countertrees that if a literal 
has a surface occurrence in a node, it has a surface occurrence in all descendants of that 
node. So, if c is an ancestor of a, then TP(b,, . . . , b,) must have a surface occurrence 
in a, too, which is impossible because a is safe and it has a surface occurrence of 
P(b,,... ,b,). The case when a is an ancestor of c is symmetric, and (32) is proved. 
Proponent acts as follows: after Opponent goes from (3 1) to the position 
Xontuins(2, [TP(bL,. . . , b, )] ) V Guperspeciul( c) 
for some c, in case the left disjunct is true, Proponent goes to this disjunct and uses 
UNZV for it; otherwise, by (32), c is a nonbranch relative of the superspecial a, and 
then Proponent goes to +3qerspeciul(c) and uses the strategy defined in Lemma 13.7 
for it. 0 
Lemma 13.9. Suppose a node a is superspeciul. Then there is a child b of a such 
that bT is efectively true. 
Proof. Suppose a is superspecial. Let Z = A!(Pl,. . . ,/&,yl,. . . , yk), where each pi is 
a literal and each yi is a nonliteral. By the above lemma, for each 1 <i Gm, -/$ 
is effectively true. And ii’ is effectively true because a is special. Then, using the 
generalized modus ponens lemma (Lemma 10.1) m times, we get that I,+, where $ = 
A!(0 = 1 ,..., O=m,y; ,.,., r;), is effectively true. Note that the arithmetical label of $ 
and the hyperlabel of ii are equal (“the” hyperlabel because ii is clean). 
Suppose the hyperlabel of 2, and hence the label of $, is 0. Then there is a devel- 
opment +’ of II/ which is effectively true, and II/’ must be the result of replacing in $ 
some O-labeled osubsentence (yj)’ (1 <j <k) by a development ($)’ of it, so we have 
that 
A!(0 = 1 ,...,O = 112, y; 2.. .,Yjz_1, Yi”, Yj’+lT.. .9r;> 
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is effectively true. Then, by generalized modus ponens again (taking into account hat 
the sentences 10 = 1 , . . . , -0 = m are effectively true), we have that 




is a child of a. Thus, a has a child whose z-translation is effectively true. 
Suppose now that the hyperlabel of 2, and hence the label of $, is 1. Then, by the 
definition of countertree, a has a child c such that 2 is a 1-hyperdevelopment of 2. 
Thus, 
for some 1 <j dk, where yj is 1-hyperlabeled and yj is its 1-hyperdevelopment. Now 
notice that ZT is a relaxed development of Zi’ and, as the latter is effectively true and 
l-labeled, ? is effectively true. 0 
Lemma 13.10. There are no super-special nodes. 
Proof. According to the previous lemma, if a is a superspecial node, then it has a 
child b such that gT has an effective solution p. We may suppose that for any pair 
(b’, p’), if b’ is a sibling of b and p’ is an effective solution to ;I’, we have 2’ .3P < 
2” . 3J”. This means that b is superspecial. Thus, any superspecial node must have a 
superspecial child, and then, if there is a superspecial node, there is an infinite chain 
of superspecial nodes in which each node is the parent of the next node in the chain, 
which is impossible because, by Remark 12.4, the tree T has a finite height. q 
We now can complete the proof of Lemma 13.1. According to Lemma 13.10, the 
root, whose content is the initial sentence ~1, is not superspecial, which, by definition 
(since the root has no predecessors and no siblings) means that simply I? is not 
effectively true. q 
To complete the proof of Theorem S.S(iii)+(i), suppose 4 q! ET. Then, by Lemma 
12.6, there is a primitive recursive countertree for 4+; and then, by Lemma 13.1, there 
is a translation z such that (4+)’ is not effectively true. Take the composition * of + 
and z. Then 4’ is not effectively true. 
14. ET is strictly between BCK and classical ogic 
The author has failed to find an axiomatization for ET, and most likely this task 
cannot be accomplished unless the language of ET is either restricted, as this is done 
in the next section, or extended by means of new multiplicative-style operators. 
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In this section we locate an interval to which ET belongs in the hierarchy of known 
sequential calculi. 
Below “(hyper)sentence” will always mean (hyper)sentence of our language L and 
“parameter”, as in the previous sections, will mean natural number. 
The reader should have noticed that in our semantics (and in the syntactic de- 
scription of ET) the formulas aV@Vy) and (crVB)Vy are the same in all reason- 
able senses. This enables us to relax the formation rules and allow formulas like 
cciV. . . VU,,, dropping all the vacuous parentheses between the Cli (of course, we can 
do the same with A,V and A, too). We also agree to identify aVlJ with pVa. That is, 
we look at crlV ’ ’ . Vu, as the application of the operator V to the multiset (011,. . , a,} 
rather than to the sequence (c(i). . . , a,). A multiset is a set which may contain more 
than one (but a finite number of) copies of its elements; in other words, a multiset 
is a sequence in which the order, - but not the quantity, - of its elements is dis- 
regarded. 
In what follows, Greek capital letters always denote the multiplicative disjunction 
cr,v... VU, of some sentences c11 , . . . , cln, for some n 3 0. If n = 1, such a “disjunction” 
is just ai, and if 12 = 0, the “disjunction” is empty; @VP, where 0 is the empty 
disjunction, is understood as /I. 
Lemma 14.1. For any hypersentences @V$ E ET and YV$ E ET, we have 
@VYV(~ A $) E ET. 
(We mean that all the married couples of @V4 and YVt+9 are preserved in @VYV(+ A 
$) and there are no other married couples in the latter.) 
Proof. Assume @V4 E ET and YV+ E ET. We proceed by induction on the sum 
of the hypercomplexities of these two hypersentences. 
Case 1: @VYV(4 A $) is O-like. A little analysis of the case convinces us that then 
one of the hypersentences @04, YV$, - say, the first one, - is O-like. This means 
that there is a 0-hyperdevelopment @‘V# E ET of @V4; the hypercomplexity of the 
former is less than the hypercomplexity of the latter, and we can use the induction 
hypothesis and conclude that @‘VYV(# A $) E ET. Now it remains to notice that 
the latter is a 0-hyperdevelopment of @VYV(4 A II/). 
Case 2: @VYV(4 A II/) is l-like. Consider an arbitrary I-hyperdevelopment 0 of 
this hypersentence. We want to show that 8 E ET. 
f3 must result from @VYV(4 A y5) by replacing a surface multiplicatively atomic 
osubsentence q by a I-hyperdevelopment v]’ of q. v] occurs in one of the osubsentences 
@, 4, Y or $, - say, in 4, and let 4’ be the result of replacing in 4 the osubsentence ye 
by yl’. Then @V@ is a 1-hyperdevelopment of @V4 and, by Lemma 6.15( 1 ), @V# E 
ET. Then, by the induction hypothesis, @VYV($’ A $), i.e. 8, belongs to ET. 0 
Remember that in our language 1 is applicable only to atoms, and in other cases it 
is used just as an abbreviation. 
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A sequent for us is a multiset { ai,. . . , a,} of sentences, written in the form at V. . . V 
~1,. So, we use ‘V” instead of “,“. The other technical difference from the common 
presentation of sequential calculi is that we use parameters (as we deal with sentences 
only) instead of free variables. 
Here is a list of (an axiom and) some sequential rules of inference, where: 
0 < in (33) is atomic; 
l a(a) in (37) and (38) is the result of substituting in a(x) all free occurrences of the 
variable x by the parameter a; 
l In (38) the parameter a does not occur in @,a(~). 
ov~v~g, (33) 
OVO!i 
OV(Mi v as)’ 
i = 1,2, 
@Vu, @Vu2 







@Vu ’ (39) 
Notice that as we deal with multisets (i.e. multiplicative disjunctions of multisets of 
disjuncts), the exchange rule 
OVaiVu,VO’ 
OVazVatVO’ 
is senseless because the premise and the conclusion of this rule are simply thought to 
be identical. 
The logic BCK, also called A&e logic, is given by the axiom (33) and the rules 
(34)-(38).9 It is known that the addition of the rule of cut to this system does not 
really extend it. 
And the whole list (33)-(39) gives classical logic CL. 
The length of a BCK-derivation of 4 is the length of the longest branch of the 
BCK-derivation tree for 4. 
9 BCK is an extension of the multiplicative-additive linear logic (MALL). The latter is given by the rules 
(34)-(38) and the axiom ~VTX, where a is atomic. 
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Lemma 14.2. For any formula 4 and any parameters c and b, if 4 has a BCK-proof 
of length I, then so does b[c/b]. 
(Recall that 4[c/b] denotes the result of replacing in 4 all the occurrences of the 
parameter c by the parameter b.) 
Proof. Induction on the length of the BCK-derivation. 
If 4 is an axiom (of the form (33)), clearly so is #r[c/b]. 
Among the rules (34)-(38) we consider only the last one; the others are more or 
less straightforward. 
So, suppose @Vu(a), where a has no occurrence in O,GL(X), has a BCK-proof of 
length 1. We want to show that then (OVYx’xcr(x))[c/b] has a BCK-proof of length 
I + 1. Let a’ be a parameter not occurring in @,a(~) and different from c and b. By 
the induction hypothesis, (OVa(a))[a/a’], i.e. OVcc(a’), has a BCK-proof of length 
1. Again, by the induction hypothesis, OVcr(a’)[c/b], i.e. (@[c/b])V(a(a’)[c/b]), has a 
BCK-proof of length 1. Notice that a’ does not occur in @[c/b], a(x)[c/b] and cr(a’)[c/b] 
is the result of replacing in cr(x)[c/b] the variable x by a’. Then, applying (38) to 
(OEclbl)V(a(a’)Cc/bl), we get that (@[c/b])V Vx(or(x)[c/b]), i.e. (OV Vxa(x))[c/b]), 
has a BCK-proof of length I + 1. Cl 
Lemma 14.3. Suppose BCK k 4 and 4’ is a I-hyperdevelopment of 4. Then BCK 
t 4’. 
Proof. We consider the case when $’ is the result of replacing in (b an osubsen- 
tence VyB(y) by B(d). The other case, when the replaced subsentence is an additive 
conjunction, is simpler. 
We proceed by induction on the length of the BCK-proof of 4. The only non- 
straightforward case the rule (38), when 4 = OV’dx’xcr(x) and BCK k OVcc(a) for a 
not occurring in 0, u(x). In view of Lemma 14.2, we may suppose that a # d. There 
are two subcases to be considered: 
Subcase 1: Vy’rp(y) and Vxxa(x) are different osubsentences of 4. Then 4’ = O’V 
Vxu(x), where 0’ is the result of replacing in 0 the osubsentence Vy’ys(y) by B(d). 
O’Va(a) is then a 1-hyperdevelopment of @7x(a) and, by the induction hypothesis, 
BCK t- @‘Vu(a). a # d implies that a does not occur in 0’; therefore, by the rule 
(38), BCK k O’Vkx(x), i.e. BCK k 4’. 
Subcase 2: Vy’rp(y) and Vxoz(x) are one and the same osubsentence of 4. Then, as 
BCK t @VU(U), we have by Lemma 14.2 that BCK E Ova(d), i.e. BCK k 4’. 0 
Fact 14.4. BCK c ET c CL (C means proper inclusion). 
Proof. The inclusion ET C CL is evident: Suppose CI E ET. Then, by Theorem 5.5(i)+ 
(ii), a is effectively true in every model; effective truth means the existence of an 
effective solution, and existence of a solution means truth; thus, CI is true in every 
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model, whence, by Theorem 5.4(ii)+(i), a E CL. And to see that this inclusion is 
proper, it is enough to check that either of the three classical tautologies listed below, 
where a is a zero-place predicate letter and /I is a l-place predicate letter, does not 
belong to ET: 
0 av-a; 
0 aV(7a n -a); 
l b’!~(P(x)V+(y)) (although ‘?Y~(P(x)V+(.Y)) E ET). 
The fact that BCK # ET can be verified by a routine checking that either of the 
following two formulas lo belongs to ET but is not derivable in the cut-free BCK: 
((-lv%) n (7Plv782)P((~lvpl> n (@2V82)), 
((-1 A -2) A ($1 A -Bz))V 
((alW1 V P2)) V (a2Wl V 82)) V ((al V a2)VBl) V ((al V a2P82)). 
It remains to show that BCK g ET. Assume BCK k 4. To show that 4 E ET, we 
use induction on the complexity of 4, under which we mean the number of occurrences 
of logical operators in 4. BCK t $J means that one of the following five cases takes 
place: 
Case 1: 4 is an axiom OV<V~~. Let 4’ be the marriage-extension (and thus a 
0-hyperdevelopment) of 4 in which the osliterals r and -r are spouses to each other. 
Clearly 4’ is l-like, and so is any 1-hyperdevelopment of +‘, any 1-hyperdevelopment 
of any 1-hyperdevelopment of #, . . . This means that 4 E ET. 
Case 2: BCK t 4 follows from BCK t- a and BCK k /? by the rule (34). The 
complexities of a and fi are less than that of 4, which enables us to use the induction 
hypothesis and conclude that a,p E ET. Then, by Lemma 14.1, 4 E ET. 
Case 3: BCK t- 4 follows from BCK t- a by one of the rules (35) or (37). The 
complexity of a is less than that of 4 and, by the induction hypothesis, a E ET. But 
a is a 0-hyperdevelopment of 4 and, by Lemma 6.15, the latter belongs to ET. 
Case 4: BCK k 4 follows from BCK k a by one of the rules (36) or (38). Then, 
observe, 4 is l-like. Consider an arbitrary 1-hyperdevelopment 4’ of 4. By Lemma 
14.3, BCK F +‘, whence, by the induction hypothesis (as the complexity of 4’ is less 
than that of 4), 4’ E ET. Thus, every 1-hyperdevelopment of the l-like 4 belongs to 
ET, and this means that 4 E ET. 0 
15. The A-free fragments of BCK and ET are the same 
Let L- denote the fragment of our language L defined by 
a E L- iff a E L and a does not contain A. 
And we define BCK- as BCK without the rule (34). 
lo The first formula is taken from [2]. 
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Theorem 15.1. For any sentence 4 of L-, BCK- I- qh H g5 E ET. 
Proof. The (+) part immediately follows from Fact 14.4. 
We prove the (e=) part by induction on the complexity of 4. Assume 4 is a sentence 
of L- and 4 E ET. 
Case 1: 4 is l-like. Taking into account that 4 is clean (see Terminology and 
Notation 6.1(6)), this implies that 4 contains a surface osubsentence of the form a A b 
or Vxa(x), that is, one of the following two subcases takes place: 
Subcase la: 4 = OVVxa(x). Let a be a parameter not occurring in 4. Ova(a) is 
a 1-hyperdevelopment of 4 and, by Lemma 6.15( 1 ), as the latter belongs to ET, so 
does the former. But the complexity of Ova(a) is less than that of 4 and then, by 
the induction hypothesis, BCK I- Ova(a); then, by the rule (38), BCK k 4. 
Subcase lb: 4 = @A(& A /?). This subcase is similar to the previous one. 
Case 2: 4 is O-like. Then 4 E ET means that there is a 0-hyperdevelopment 4’ E ET 
of 4, i.e. one of the following three subcases takes place. 
Subcase 2a: I$’ is a marriage-extension f 4. This means that I$ contains surface 
osliterals < and -r, and as 4 is A-free, 4 has the form @VY 015, i.e. it is an axiom. 
Subcase 2b: 4 = OV(ai V az) and 4’ = OVai (i = 1 or i = 2). By the induction 
hypothesis, BCK I- OVai, whence, by the rule (35), BCK t 4. 
Subcase 2c: g5 = OV3xa(x) and 4’ = Ova(a). This subcase is similar to the 
previous one. Cl 
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